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The following notations and abbreviations are found throughout this thesis:
• The set of integers.
• + The set of positive real numbers.
N  The set of nodes (N =  {1 , . . . ,  n}).
E  The set of links (E =  { 1 , . . . ,  e}).
G The directed network (G =  (N, E)).
M  The set of players (M =  { 1 , . . . ,  m}).
fj  A flow routed on link j.
tj{-) A latency function of link j.
f  A flow quantity controlled by player i.
f j  A flow quantity of player i on link j  ( f l =  EjeE  fj)-
P A routing strategy of player i that represents a partition of f l amongst all 
n links (f* =  { f \ , . . . , f ln)).
f A flow of which is a combination of player strategies, one for each player
/  The total network flow quantity ( /  =  f  and /  =  fj)-
w A weight vector (w =  ( / x, . . . ,  f m)).
Cl{f) A cost of player i in f (Cl(f) = 'EjeE fj^j(fj)  where f j  is in P for every 
j  € E).
Cj(f) A cost of player i from link j  in f (C j(f) =  f f a i f j )  where / j  is in f).
C(f) A social cost of flow f  ((7(f) =  C*(f) and C(f) =  E j&e f j t j ( f j ) ) -








f OJ:j Social optimal flow. 
fNE Nash flow.
fSSL Selfish Stackelberg leadership flow, 
f  ̂  User equilibrium flow.
C®E Social cost of f®E .
CNE Social cost of f^ E.
cSSL Social cost of f ^ E.
^min A minimal latency of links used,
fmax A maximal latency of links used.
RLS Randomised Local Search.
Aft(f) A flow after the h-th move from an initial flow f  (Ao(f) =  f and A/j(f) 
is obtained by a single move of one players flow from A/l_i(f)).
Cj A capacity of link j.
Cmax The ratio of largest to smallest non-empty link capacities.
/max The ratio of largest to smallest player flow.
P{\h) A potential of flow \h ( P( \h) =  YljeE(fj(Xh))2/cj +
X
Preface
This thesis is mainly my own work and the sources from which material is drawn are 
identified within. Chapter 1 and 2 contain introductory materials, literature review, 
notations, definitions, properties and examples of which are drawn from various authors 
from several related works, in particular from Roughgarden and Tardos [RT02] more 
than others. Chapter 4 is based on the paper [GP07] that has been co-authored by 
Paul Goldberg, and is intended to submit for publication. Chapter 5, is an extension 
of Goldberg’s work [Gol04]—namely in [Gol04] identical links are considered while we 
consider variable-capacity links. Some definitions and notations in that chapter are 
borrowed from Even-dar et al.’s work [EDKM07], for instance the potential function. 







We study a class of games in which a finite number of “selfish players” each controls 
a quantity of traffic to be routed through a congestion network in which n directed 
links are connected from a common source to a common destination. In particular, we 
investigate its equilibria in two settings.
Firstly, we consider a splittable flow model in which players are able to split their 
own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has 
contrasted the social cost of Nash equilibria with the best possible social cost. Here 
we show that additional costs are incurred in situations where a selfish “leader” player 
allocates its flow, and then commits to that choice so that other players are compelled 
to minimise their own cost based on the first player’s choice. We find that even in simple 
networks, the leader can often improve its own cost at the expense of increased social 
cost. Focussing on a two-player case, we give upper and lower bounds on the worst-case 
additional cost incurred.
Secondly, we study the computation of pure Nash equilibrium for a load balancing 
game with variable-capacity links. In particular, we consider a simple generic algorithm 
for local optimisation; Randomised Local Search (RLS), which can simulate a network 
of selfish users that have no central control and only interact via the effect they have 
on the cost latency functions of links. It is known that an algorithm with series of 
self-improving moves will eventually reach the Nash equilibrium. Our contribution here 
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This thesis concerns the computation of equilibria in congestion networks. A congestion 
network is a directed graph in which a routing cost of each edge increases as a traffic on 
it increases. What happens when two or more players want to route their traffic through 
links in the network? Naturally, every player acts selfishly, choosing a routing strategy 
that will minimise its cost, without regard to other players’ cost. Certainly, every 
player would expect the other players to behave in a similar egocentric fashion. Such a 
network is called non-cooperative model and a famous example of it is the Internet. A 
non-cooperative model has become increasing important in computer science and game 
theory community.
A non-cooperative model is extensively studied in game theory community. Game 
theory is the study of multi-person decision problems. A game is a mathematical rep­
resentation of the phenomena when decision-makers interact. A game consists of a set 
of players, a set of strategies available to those players and a specification payoffs for 
each combination of strategies.
1.1 Background
To introduce and motivate the questions investigated in this thesis, let us informally de­
scribe two basic games. The first is “Cournot competition” (sometimes called “Cournot 
duopoly” in economics as the model represents a market with only two producers), 
which was introduced by Cournot in 1838. The second is “congestion game” , which was 
introduced by Rosenthal in 1973 [Ros73a].
1.1.1 Cournot Competition
Imagine there are two firms in the market that produce the same good. Suppose that 
the cost experienced by each firm increases as the output it produces increases. All the
1
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output is sold at a single price, determined by the demand for the good and the firms’ 
total output. Suppose that the market price decreases as the total output increases 
(unless it is already zero). Each firm’s revenue is its output times price. Thus each 
firm’s profit is its revenue minus its cost.
Assuming both firms are selfish, namely each firm wants to achieve the highest 
possible profit, typical question to be asked would be what quantities q\ and <72, will 
firm 1 and firm 2 manufacture respectively? Assume that both firms make their decision 
simultaneously and independently; initially, each firm chooses to manufacture a quantity 
that will minimise its cost without information of the other firm’s output. Both firms are 
allowed to change their output provided that, after the change, their profit will increase. 
After a long enough sequence of changes, we would expect the market to reach a stable 
state in a sense that no firm can increase its profit by changing its output unilaterally. 
This stable state is known in the game theory community as a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that firm 1 has a Stackelberg leadership. That is firm 1 chooses what qi 
at the start of the game and has to fix to that <71, then firm 2 chooses <72, knowing 
the output chosen by firm 1. To find the Nash equilibrium in this case, firstly, for 
any output <71, player 1 knows that player 2 will always manufacture the output that 
maximises its profit. Suppose that for each output q\ of firm 1 there is one such output 
of firm 2; denote this with 62(91), thus the total output is <71 +  62(<7i ). Intuitively, firm 1 
manufactures q\ that together with its corresponding 62(91) maximises its profit.
It has been noticed that in the situation where firm 1 has the Stackelberg leadership, 
it produces more output and obtains more profit than the situation where both firms 
chooses a good to produce simultaneously. Subsequently, firm 2 produces less output 
and obtains less profit in the sequential-move scenario than it does in the simultaneous- 
choose scenario. More importantly, it turns out that firm l ’s profit rises by a lesser 
amount than firm 2’s profit falls, thus the aggregate profit is lower, (see e.g. 2.1.B 
in [Gib92] for more details)
1.1.2 Congestion Network Game
The Cournot competition suggests two interesting observations: the entire network can 
be worse off with a Stackelberg leader than the standard Nash setting, and a sequence 
of “self-improving” moves could lead to an equilibrium in the market. Next, we consider 
a congestion network game which has been studied recently by researchers in computer 
science as a basic foundation of routing information in a computer network. Our con­
centration will be on the loss of network efficiency in a model with a Stackelberg leader 
from the model where all players simultaneously compete for their minimal costs.
We begin by imagining there are two players that wish to route a flow from the same
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source to the same destination through a shared network. Suppose that each player can 
split its flow arbitrarily across all links in which each player experiences a cost of using 
each link that is proportional to the sum of the total flow sharing that link. Thus, the 
total cost experienced by each player is the sum over all links of the cost of using each 
link. Again we assume that both players are selfish, want to minimise their own cost 
without regard to the cost that the other player might suffer from the decision it makes. 
If we let the game runs with both players making their decision simultaneously and 
independently, similar to the Cournot competition, we expect the network to eventually 
reach the Nash equilibrium after a long enough sequence of flow changes.
Suppose that player 1 has a Stackelberg leadership. Being selfish, player 1 may find 
that it pays to route more flow on “cheaper” links, forcing player 2 to route less flow on 
those links, but more flow on “more expensive” links than it does in the simultaneous 
setting.
For a better explanation, imagine an example of the network that has two parallel 
links. The cost of using link 1 equals the total flow on it, and the cost of using link 2 
equals twice the total flow on it plus 1. Each player has one unit of flow to route. 
Assume that player 1 routes the fractions f l  and f\ of its flow on link 1 and link 2 
respectively. Similarly, assume that player 2 routes the fractions f\ and /| of its flow 
on link 1 and link 2 respectively. The total cost experienced by player 1 is f\ times the 
total flow on link 1, plus f\ times the total flow on link 2. The total cost experienced 
by player 2 is ,/f times the total flow on link 1, plus /| times the total flow on link 2. 
The social cost is the sum of player l ’s cost and player 2’s cost.
The Nash equilibrium in this setting is the point when both players route 7/9 of 
their flow on link 1 and the rest on link 2. When player 1 has the Stackelberg leadership, 
it could have achieved its cost at the Nash equilibrium, but chooses to play differently 
if that means its individual cost will be lower. It finds that overusing link 1 will force 
player 2 to move some of its flow from link 1 to link 2, which will result in a lower 
cost for player 1. Specifically, player 1 routes 5/6 on link 1 inducing player 2 to route 
3/4 on link 1, i.e. 1/36 less than it does at the Nash equilibrium. Consequently, in 
the simultaneous-move setting, the cost of both player 1 and player 2 are 1.63, and the 
social cost is 3.26. In the sequential-move setting, the cost of player 1 is reduced to 
1.62, but the cost of player 2 increases to 1.65, as a result, the social cost increases to 
3.27. In summary, the cost of player 1 falls in the sequential-move setting by a lesser 
amount than the cost of player 2 rises in the sequential-move setting.
We have just reaffirmed that there may be an additional cost in a Nash equilibrium 
when one of the players is allowed to have a Stackelberg leadership, over and above the 
standard simultaneous-setting Nash equilibrium. In this thesis, we study this additional 
cost. Specifically, we consider a two-player game in a network with n parallel links where
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each link has an non-decreasing convex latency function. Each player has a quantity 
of flow that can be split across available links. All players are assumed to be selfish 
and will route their flow to minimise their personal cost. In order to gain a better 
understanding of this principle, we study the computation of Nash equilibrium in these 
networks, thus developing techniques and mathematical tools for quantifying the worst 
additional social cost due to a selfish Stackelberg leader in this setting.
1.1.3 Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium is arguably one of the most fundamental concepts in game the­
ory [Osb94]. It is well known to be named after John Nash for his contribution in 
the 1951 paper [Nas51] that proved that, in any game with a finite number of actions, 
at least one equilibrium exists. Thereafter, Nash equilibrium has been studied exten­
sively in many contexts by many researchers of many different fields. For the past few 
decades, researchers in theoretical computer science have been trying to create a foun­
dational understanding of the selfish behaviour of users in the Internet. It seems that a 
natural tool to analyse this class of problems may come from that of the noncooperative 
game theory, and an appropriate solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium.
However, the original notion of Nash equilibrium studied by Nash has limitations in 
representing the present-day Internet. First, the classical Nash equilibrium that arises 
in a game has a finite set of players, while in the today Internet, there are so many 
users that it could be deemed as infinitely many user network. Second, in the classical 
Nash equilibrium, all players are assumed to have “perfect-information” , that is every 
player knows what every other players do. This is impossible with the astronomical 
scale of the Internet and the limited amount of time for each player to choose a path 
for transferring data.
There are a few alternative approaches that we can see being a mathematical rep­
resentation of the Internet. For example “Selfish routing” initialised by Roughgarden 
and Tardos [RT02] considers a simpler network in which there are an infinite num­
ber of infinitesimally small players. A Nash equilibrium in this setting is often called 
“Wardrop s first principle” which states that all users choose a minimal-cost path to 
route their traffic (we briefly discuss the computation of Nash equilibrium in this setting 
in Section 2.3). Another possible alternative is an approximate Nash equilibrium of a 
model where each user is restricted to some constraints, e.g. a user only aware of other 
“nearby” users’ traffic activities.
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1.1.4  The Problem Statements
Interesting classes of noncooperative games are congestion games [Ros73a] and its equiv­
alent model of potential games [MS96]. Recent works on Nash equilibrium in congestion 
games can be briefly summarised as follows:
1. Quality of Nash equilibrium:
(a) the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria with distinct cost functions 
in a system of selfish players.
(b) the loss of social welfare due to selfish, uncoordinated behaviour by comparing 
the social cost of Nash equilibrium with the socially optimal cost.
2. Computation of a Nash equilibrium:
(a) via “unrestricted algorithms” .
(b) via algorithms that simulate selfish behaviour.
In this thesis, we study two of those topics: lb  and 2b. Regarding the problem of the 
quality of Nash equilibrium, it is known that a Nash equilibrium is suboptimal [RT02], 
Furthermore, as we have shown in examples of Cournot competition and congestion 
network game, there can also be an additional cost to the Nash equilibrium of a network 
that has a Stackelberg leader. We are interested to know how much is the additional 
social cost because of a selfish leader, specifically in two-player games?
Regarding the problem of the computation of Nash equilibrium, we study a simple 
generic algorithm for local optimisation called Randomised Local Search that can con­
struct a Nash equilibrium. It is known that there are efficient algorithms for finding 
a Nash equilibrium (e.g. [FKK+02, EDKM07]). The main reason we are interested in 
studying Randomised Local Search is because it can be realised by a simple distributed 
network of selfish users that have no central control and only interact via the effect they 
have on the latency functions of links, hence simulates a real network of internet users.
For this problem, the model will be slightly different from that of the problem of 
the quality of Nash equilibrium. We concentrate on a finite number of players, rather 
than just two players usually assumed in the previous problem. Moreover, each player 
chooses a single link to route its flow, rather than splitting its flow across available links. 
This is called pure strategy. An opposite strategy to pure strategy is mixed strategy in 
which each player decides on a probability for each pure strategy. By restricting to pure 
strategy, we always have, at least, one pure Nash equilibrium in our setting [FKK+02, 
EDKM07].
Consider the congestion game shown in Subsection 1.1.2, Randomised Local Search 
(RLS) could construct a Nash equilibrium as follows. At each step, RLS selects a
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player and a link uniformly at random. The player moves its flow to that link if its 
resulting cost is lower. It is known (e.g. [EDKM07, FKK+02]) that an algorithm with the 
sequence of such “self-improving” moves in this particular setting must eventually reach 
a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, RLS will not make a self-improving move on every attempt, 
however, we show that RLS has a high enough probability of selecting a successful 
attempt to construct a Nash equilibrium quickly.
For this topic, we will be concentrating on a potential game framework. In a potential 
game, there is a potential function which maps a current state of the game to a real 
number (in our situation, a state would mean the assignment of flows to links). Thus, 
in our RLS, the move happens when the resulting potential is lower. If the change to 
player costs and that to the potential function caused by a move of a single player flow 
is related by a factor that only depends on that player, the game is called “weighted 
potential game” which is what we will be focussing on. (For other types of potential 
games see previous works later in this chapter or [MS96].)
Our focus will be on the load-balancing model introduced by Koutsoupias and Pa- 
padimitriou [KP99], that is intended to model a simple version of the Internet of users 
and service providers. A load balancing game is essentially equivalent to a two nodes 
connected by parallel links. We consider a scenario where each player controls a non- 
negligible flow.
The problems being studied in this thesis can be summarised as follows:
• How much is the loss of social welfare due to a selfish leader, especially in the 
two-player scenario? The problem is extensively studied in Chapters 2-4.
• Does RLS converge quickly to a Nash equilibrium in a load balancing game? In 
Chapter 5, we present convergence rate bounds of RLS to address this problem.
1.2 Our Contributions
Our contributions can be categorised into two main topics. In Subsection 1.2.1 we 
describe the results in Chapter 3 and 4, and the results, which are described in Subsec­
tion 1.2.2, are based on the study in Chapter 5.
To describe our results more precisely, we must be more formal about our model of 
selfish routing in a congestion network. We consider a parallel-link network in which 
there are n links, all of which directing from a common source node to a common sink 
node. Each link has a latency function as a function of the link congestion on it. We 
assume that all latency functions are non-negative, non-decreasing and convex. There 
are m players, each of which controls a non-negligible flow to be routed from the source 
to the sink. In Chapter 3 and 4, we assume player flows are splittable, while unsplittable
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flow is studied in Chapter 5. For the splittable flow scenario, each player experiences 
the cost that is the sum, over all links used by that player, of the amount of that player’s 
flow on that link multiplied by the latency of using that link, while, for the unsplittable 
flow case, each player experiences the total cost of the link which that player uses.
We assume that every player will always choose a routing strategy, namely an as­
signment of flow, that will minimise its cost. As the route which is chosen by one player 
affects the congestion (and hence the latency) experienced by others, it is natural to 
apply the theory of a non-cooperative game. Following the conventions of the non- 
cooperative game, the network is at Nash equilibrium if no player can reduce its cost 
by unilaterally changing its routing strategy. The network is called system equilibrium 
(SE) [CP91] when the network has a minimal-possible total cost.
1.2.1 Bounding the Price of Selfish Stackelberg Leadership
In Chapters 3 and 4, our focus is on a network of two players, each with a non-negligible 
splittable flow. We call a player a leader if it has a Stackelberg leadership, that is, a 
leader chooses its routing strategy before others. The leader is not allowed to change 
its routing strategy afterwards. The other player(s) is called follower(s). The followers 
react to the leader’s strategy, reaching the Nash equilibrium relative to it. In the case 
of two-player games in which we will be study mainly in Chapter 4, the follower will 
treat the leader’s flow as constant, and will try to achieve a system equilibrium relative 
to the modified network. In other words, the follower will behave like an optimal 
flow relative to the modified network after the leader has played. The network is at 
Stackelberg equilibrium when the flow of the followers reaches a Nash equilibrium, or, 
in the case of two-player games, the follower reach a system equilibrium. We call 
the Stackelberg equilibrium where the leader’s cost is minimal the selfish Stackelberg 
leadership equilibrium (which will often be shortened to SSL equilibrium).
The main objective is to obtain bounds on the additional social cost caused when 
one of the players becomes a leader. We define the worst ratio between the social cost 
at Nash equilibria and that at SSL equilibria, the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership 
(which will often be shortened to the price of SSL).
Even though, a game of two players is one of the most basic models studied in non- 
cooperative game theory, it is arguably one of the most studied games. Many classical 
examples are two-player games, for instance Cournot competition which we have shown 
earlier, the prisoner’s dilemma which famously illustrates that Nash equilibrium is sub- 
optimal, and the battle of sexes which shows that there could be more than one pure 
Nash equilibria.
In Chapter 2, we give the basic definitions and preliminary technical results needed in
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the rest of this thesis. The technical results, which are shown in Section 2.2-2.4, include 
techniques for finding a system equilibrium, a Nash equilibrium and a SSL equilibrium. 
By using the techniques, we demonstrate the social costs of several alternative network 
set-ups to not only show the positive price of SSL, but also compare and contrast to 
other problems studied in related works.
In Chapter 3, we study lower bounds on the price of SSL for various latency function 
forms. From examples shown in Chapter 2, we notice that, different sets of coefficients 
of latency functions and a player fraction can generate different prices of SSL. This has 
raised a few questions which lead us to the experiments in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, we 
optimise the price of SSL with respect to coefficients of latency functions and a fraction 
of player flows in simple restricted networks. The latency functions considered are affine 
linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic. We solve the optimisation problem by using a local 
search algorithm that is based on Hill climbing (see e.g. [RN03] for more detail on 
Hill climbing). We found that, for the network of two players, both with access to two 
parallel links, each of which has affine linear latency functions, the price of SSL can be 
as high as 1.075. For polynomial latency functions, we found the price of SSL of 1.091, 
1.135 and 1.161 for quadratic, cubic and quartic latency functions respectively. For an 
asymmetric network that has two private links which only the owner of that link can 
use, and one shared link; every link has a linear latency function, we show the price of 
SSL of 1.074. These prices of SSL establish lower bounds.
In Chapter 4, we study upper bounds on the price of SSL. Our focus will be on 
linear latency functions. If the latency functions are homogenous—homogenous linear 
functions are in the form of f {x )  — ax where a >  0, not only is there no price of 
SSL, but also all players split their flows in a uniform way. For the case of affine linear 
latency functions, we show that the price of SSL is at most multiplicative constant (thus, 
independent of the number of links) at most 1.322. This upper bound corresponds to 
the lower bound of a multiplicative factor of 1.075.
1.2.2 Bounding the Convergence Rate of Randomised Local Search in 
a Load-balancing Game with Variable-capacity Resources
In contrast, in Chapter 5, we are concerned with an algorithm that can construct a Nash 
equilibrium and the time it takes to reach a Nash equilibrium, rather than the quality 
of Nash equilibrium. Our focus is still on the parallel-link network. However there 
are some crucial differences between this chapter and the previous chapters. First, we 
consider m players in this chapter while two-player games are considered in the previous 
chapter. Moreover player flows are restricted to be integer, and the total flow is not 
necessarily one as previously assumed in the previous chapters. And finally player flows
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are unsplittable, that is each player chooses a single link to route its flow.
We assume that all player flows are positive integer in the range {1 , . . . ,  / max} where 
/m ax denotes the ratio of the maximal to the minimal player flow. Every link in the net­
work has a capacity which is assumed to be a positive integer in the range {1 , . . . ,  cmax} 
where cmax denotes the ratio of the maximal to the minimal capacity. This model is 
equivalent to the parallel-link network in which each link has a homogeneous linear 
latency function of the form f (x )  =  ax, where the coefficient a is a fraction of one over 
the capacity of that link.
We study a simple generic local search called Randomised Local Search (RLS). An 
attempt is the process via RLS of selecting a single player and a single link uniformly at 
random. If the selected player can reduce its cost by transferring its flow to the selected 
link, then that attempt is successful. We call a successful attempt a move. We study 
the number of attempts RLS takes to reach a Nash equilibrium.
We show that RLS can be realised in a distributed setting and present a distributed 
version of RLS that can be executed by all players simultaneously in non-cooperative 
games.
Two upper bounds are proved for the expected number of attempts for Nash conver­
gence via RLS. Firstly, we quickly obtained an upper bound of 0 (m 3n (/max)2(cmax)2). 
Secondly, with a more detailed analysis, we prove an alternative upper bound of 
O (n(mcmaxf max) {n 4- cmax/ max)). We consider the later bound to be better in a sense 
that the number if players m decreases from cubic to quadratic, and could be linear in 
the distributed setting.
1.3 Previous Work
In this section, we describe and compare some previous works related to the problems 
studied in this thesis.
Selfish Routing
The term “selfish routing” was initialised in computer science mainly by Roughgar- 
den and Tardos in [Rou05a, RT02] to represent a model of non-cooperative, selfish 
users simultaneously active in transportation networks. However, the original concept 
was formally formulated as far as the work of Beckmann et al. in 1955 [BMW55], 
Most of the early works considered the selfish routing in transportation models, until 
Rosenthal [Ros73a, Ros73b] described how the transportation model can be naturally 
generalised to a more abstract setting, and introduced the name “congestion game” for 
the model in 1973.
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Even though, a selfish routing in congestion games has been studied extensively 
thereafter, it was not until 1999 that the idea of quantifying the cost of selfish routing 
was proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [KP99]. The main idea is to mea­
sure how much selfishness can degrade the overall performance of a system. The term 
coordination ratio was used as a tool to measure the degradation in that paper, but 
later Papadimitriou replaced it with the new term, the “price of anarchy” in [PapOl], 
The term mathematically represents the ratio of the cost in the worst possible Nash 
equilibrium to the best possible social cost.
The concept of the price of anarchy of selfish routing has been studied in numer­
ous variants and generalisations. Two of the earliest works that studied the concept 
are [KP99, RT02], Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [KP99] studied a simple parallel- 
link network (though it was called a load-balancing network in that paper) which 
is one of the most commonly studied network topologies in computer science (e.g. 
[CV02, KL097b, KP99, MS01, ORS93, Rou04]). In that work, each user chooses a 
probability based on the set of links (specifying the probability that the user will route 
all of its flow on a given link). Each user wishes to minimise the expected cost it will 
experience, while the global objective is to minimise the maximum expected latency. 
They obtained a tight analysis of the price of anarchy in two-node, two-link networks 
and obtained partial results for two-node networks with three or more parallel links.
Roughgarden and Tardos [RT02] studied the price of anarchy in a nonatomic model, 
in which there is an infinite number of players, each of whom controls a negligible 
amount of traffic. For a general network, they proved that, if the latency of each link 
is a linear function of its congestion, then the price of anarchy is at most 4/3. For 
the more general setting in which the edge latency functions are assumed only to be 
continuous and nondecreasing in the edge congestion, they showed that the price of 
anarchy is unbounded; however, the social cost of selfish users is no more than the 
total cost incurred by optimally routing twice as much traffic (see the book [Rou05a] 
by Roughgarden for a good overview of the price of anarchy).
The Price of Selfish Stackelberg Leadership
In contrast with the previous works on selfish routing that study games in the simulta­
neous setting, namely every player play a game simultaneously, we are interested in the 
model of having one of the players acts as a leader who will select its strategy before 
others. If the leader hold its strategy fixed, the other players react to the modified 
network, reaching the Nash equilibrium relative to it. This model is described in the 
game theory community as a Stackelberg game, and its corresponding equilibrium is
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known as a Stackelberg equilibrium. The Stackelberg game is named after von Stack- 
elberg [von34] who originally considered the model of two competing companies. He 
introduced the idea of two-stage game; the leader choosing a strategy in the first stage, 
and the follower choosing a strategy in the second stage, with full knowledge of the 
leader’s strategy.
Many works have studied the Stackelberg games and the corresponding Stackelberg 
equilibria in congestion games, for example [CS07, ES90, KS06, KPS05, KK07, KL097a, 
KM02, Rou04, Swa07, YZM07]. Problems that recent works have considered in the 
Stackelberg game include
• What is the loss (or gain) of efficiency of the system with a Stackelberg leader?
• What is the impact of the following leader behaviours:
1. A selfish leader— a leader whose objective is to minimise its own cost.
2. A benign leader—a leader whose objective is to achieve the lowest possible 
social cost of the system.
3. A malicious leader—a leader whose objective is to maximise the social cost 
of the system.
Most of the recent works on the Stackelberg games considered the benign leader in 
the context of network flow as a tool for mitigating the degradation due to selfish users, 
for instance [CS07, KS06, KPS05, KL097a, Rou04, Swa07]. The fraction of the flow 
that is controlled by the leader is routed so as to minimise the social cost in the presence 
of followers who minimise their own cost. One of the earlier works that studied this 
problem was by Korilis et al. [KL097a]. They considered a model of a finite number 
of players, each with a splittable flow in a parallel-link network with linear latency 
functions. They proposed the leader’s guaranteed-optimal strategy and methodology 
to derive it. Roughgarden [Rou04] investigated the same parallel-link model, but with 
infinitely many infinitesimal followers. He showed that it is A7P-hard to find an optimal 
strategy for the benign leader in this setting. Furthermore, he proved that if an a 
fraction of the overall traffic can be globally regulated, then for an arbitrary class of 
latency functions, there is a strategy that ensures that the price of anarchy is at most 
l/a. For the same model, Kaporis and Spirakis [KS06] analysed the least portion of a 
total flow that the leader must have in order to enforce the optimal system cost.
In contrast to other recent works on the Stackelberg games in congestion networks, 
we are interested in the impact of a selfish leader on the networks. We consider a 
basic model in which there are one leader and one follower, each with a non-negligible
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splittable flow1. We study an additional social cost occurred when the leader chooses 
the strategy that will minimise the leader’s cost, by predicting what the followers will 
do afterward to maximise their own costs.
We denote the additional social cost induced by a leader with the price of selfish 
Stackelberg leadership. The concept of the price of SSL, as far as we know, has never 
been formally studied even for a simple two-player game studied in this thesis. However, 
there have been observations of this additional cost, for example, in Cournot competi­
tion, Gibbon [Gib92] pointed out that a follower profit falls more than a leader profit 
rises when compare to the standard Nash equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium
In this thesis, we study Nash equilibrium of the atomic splittable model. Nash equilib­
rium is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players. The original concept 
was first developed by Cournot in 1838 for pure strategies in a two-player game. Back 
then Nash equilibrium was called Cournot equilibrium. It was a long time after then 
before von Neumann and Morgenstern [vM44] introduced Nash equilibrium for mixed 
strategies and showed that a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium will exist for any zero-sum 
game2 with a finite set of actions in 1944. In 1951, Nash [Nas51] had a breakthrough 
result by showing that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for any game with a finite set 
of actions must exist.
Many researchers have pursued existence and uniqueness results of Nash equilibrium 
for the atomic model and several extensions. Orda et al. [ORS93] showed that the Nash 
equilibrium of a network of two nodes connected by parallel links each of which has 
a convex latency function always exists. This fact is used in out thesis to guarantee 
the existence of Nash equilibrium. They further proved that if latency functions are 
increasing functions, the Nash equilibrium is unique. They proved their theorems using 
the classical existence theorem of [Ros65]. Independently, Harker [Har85] proved the 
same facts using the theory of variational inequalities. Altman et al. [ABJSOO] extended 
the uniqueness results to general networks for a restricted class of latency functions. 
Haurie and Marcott [HM85] showed that the Nash equilibrium for the nonatomic model 
is the unique limit of any sequence of Nash equilibria obtained for a sequence of the 
atomic splittable games in which the number of players is finite and tends to infinity.
1A model where there are finitely many players each with non-negligible spittable flow is sometimes 
called an atomic model, and a player in the model is called atomic player.
2 A game in which a player’s gain or loss is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of the other 
player(s). If the total gains o f the players are added up, and the total losses are subtracted, they will 
sum to zero.
1.3. PREVIOUS WORK 13
The Convergence Rate of RLS
In Chapter 5, We consider a simple generic algorithm called Randomised Local Search 
(RLS) since it is similar to “randomised local search” that is studied in other contexts. 
Because of its generic and simple to implement, RLS is used in many problems, especially 
as a generic optimisation method ([GW03, NW07, Weg03, WW05]). For example, given 
a binary string of length m with a function /  : {0, l } m —> • to be optimised, RLS 
can be used to flip repeatedly a random bit. The change is accepted whenever /  is 
higher for the modified string. In the context of minimum spanning tree [NW07] and 
maximum matching [GW03], a variant of RLS is used where two bits may be flipped 
simultaneously. In our setting, an assignment is an element of { 1 , . . . ,  n}m where m is 
the number of players and n is the number of links. RLS repeatedly replaces a random 
entry of this vector by a random element of {1 , . . . ,  n}, and accepts the new assignment 
if its potential value of /  is lower. RLS is a variant of the more extensively studied 
(1+1) Evolutionary Algorithm of [DJW02],
We study a congestion game in a framework of a potential game which was in­
troduced by Monderer and Shapley [MS96]. In a potential game, there is a potential 
function which maps a flow configuration to a real number. Comparing the change 
in player’s cost with that in the potential function as a result of that player deviates 
its route, Monderer and Shapley categorised a class of potential games as follows. In 
an exact potential game, the change are identical. In a weighted potential game, the 
changes are related by a factor that depends only on the player. In an ordinal potential 
game, the changes are in the same direction, while, in a generalised potential game, 
a decrease in a players cost implies a decrease in the potential function (but not vice 
versa). In this thesis, we borrow the potential function from [EDKM07] in which the 
game is proved to be a weighted potential game.
Our focus in this topic is on pure strategies in a parallel-link network network with 
arbitrary capacities. It was shown by Fotakis et al. [FKK+02] how to find a pure- 
strategy Nash equilibrium in polynomial time with respect to the number of players in 
the model. In the same setting, Feldmann et al. [FGL+03] termed an algorithm that 
constructs a Nash equilibrium from an arbitrary state without increasing the social cost, 
a Nashification algorithm. They showed that an algorithm that allows an unsatisfied 
player to move using its best strategy may take time exponential in the number of 
players, for both identical link and links with arbitrary capacities.
We consider an integer flow setting, i.e. all players flow are positive integer. Even- 
dar at el. [EDKM07] proved an upper bound for the time an self-improving algorithm 
takes to reach a Nash equilibrium. The bound is of 0(IU 2c^ax) where W  denotes the 
maximal total weight of players. Note that W  would be equivalent to m /max in our
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notation system.
With regard to random algorithms constructing Nash equilibria, Even-dar at el. [EDKM07] 
studies “Random” algorithm, in which at each step a player is randomly selected; then 
its flow is moved to the lowest-cost link. They obtained an upper bound of 0 ( W  +  m) for 
identical links. In the same model, Goldberg [Gol04] studied RLS and proved a bound 
of 0 (n 2m /max) for the integer flow setting. The work in this topic in this thesis is mo­
tivated by [Gol04] and somewhat an attempt to extend [Gol04]. For unrestricted-flow, 
Goldberg also proved an upper bound of 0 ( /^ axn4m5 log(mn)).
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. The notations of the model and the basic 
definitions are formally given in Chapter 2. This is followed by the definitions and 
computational methods of the three equilibrium concepts; System equilibrium, Nash 
equilibrium and SSL equilibrium. We end Chapter 2 with Pigou’s example, in which 
we study a simple two-node, two-parallel-link network in various set-ups.
The methods used to compute the equilibria described earlier are used in Chapter 3 
in our optimisation program to find the lower bound of the price of SSL. We give several 
examples which shows that the price of SSL in a simple two-parallel-link networks with 
latency functions that are linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic, and a simple asymmetric 
network where two links are private links and one link is a shared link: every links have 
linear latency functions. The upper bounds on the price of SSL for the two players in a 
parallel-link network with linear latency functions are proved in Chapter 4. We end the 
chapter with the results showing that the price of SSL for homogeneous linear latency 
functions is one and Nash flow and SSL flow are identical and unique.
We study RLS in load balancing games in Chapter 5. We show a distributed version 
of RLS before proving the upper bounds on the number of attempts RLS take to reach 
a Nash equilibrium for players with integer flow.
Finally, the conclusions and possibilities for future works are discussed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we present the notations, basic definitions and properties needed for 
the rest of the thesis. In Section 2.1, we give the formal definitions and notations of the 
models. We discuss the characteristics and techniques for finding a system equilibrium, 
a Nash equilibrium and a SSL equilibrium in Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. 
Finally, in Section 2.5, we present a simple example that whereby using techniques 
for finding the equilibria shown in the earlier sections, demonstrates the social cost of 
several alternative network set-ups. The social costs will not only show the additional 
social cost that could arise in a SSL equilibrium over that in a Nash equilibrium, but are 
also used to compare and contrast the problem studied in this thesis with the previous 
works discussed in Section 1.3.
2.1 The Model
We consider a directed network G = (N, E), where N  is a set of nodes (or vertices) and 
E  is a set of links (or edges). We consider a special case where there are two nodes in N, 
where we call one of the nodes a source and the other node a sink. A link is a directed 
link that connects the source node to the sink node. We denote n the number of links 
in E, i.e. \E\ =  n. For each link j  € E, we define a latency function £j : • + — * • + as 
the cost of using link j  which is a function of the load on j . We will generally assume 
that latency functions are non-negative, continuous and non-decreasing.
We denote a set of noncooperative players by M  and the number of players by m. 
Each player routes its flow from the source to the sink by splitting its flow over the set of 
available links. For each player i E M, p  € • + denotes an amount of flow belonging to 
player i, (in the related literature, flow is sometimes called “weight” or “demand” ), and 
/ j  denotes a non-negative flow of player i assigned to link j . Let P = (/| , . . . , / * )  denote 
a strategy (or a player flow) of player i that represents a partition of f  amongst all n
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links in E. Let a flow f  =  ( f1, . . . ,  i m) denote a combination of player strategies, one 
for each player (A flow is sometimes called a player profile, or a solution). Let /  € • + 
denote an amount of the total flow in the system. A flow f  is feasible if /  =  YIiem f l. 
Furthermore, let w denote a weight vector ( f 1, . . . ,  f m) that specifies how much flow 
each player has.
Given a total flow / ,  fj  € * + denotes the portion of /  on link j  G E, i.e. /  =  fj. 
We usually assume (by re-scaling as necessary) that the total amount of flow is one 
(unless we explicitly state another quantity). Regarding the latency functions Ej, if fj  
is the flow routed on j  then the latency of link j  is t j ( f j ). It is sometimes useful to let 
ij denote Ej(fj).
We often denote one of the players as player 1 and the other as player 2. Also, we 
call the leader player 1, and the follower player 2 in the case where one of them is a 
leader.
Definition 2.1.1. The cost experienced by a player with respect to a flow f  =  ( f1, . . . ,  f rri) 
is the sum, over all links used by that player, of the amount of that player’s flow on that 
link multiplied by the cost of using that link. ( The cost of the link is of course affected 
by the other players ’ strategies.) The cost of player i under the flow f  is denoted by
=  (2-1)
j € E
We often use Cl for the cost of player i, dropping f, if the reference to the flow is 
clear from the context or unnecessary. It is useful sometimes to denote Cj =  f)Ej(fj) 
the contribution to player z’s cost from link j,  thus
&  =
j € E
We define a social cost C (f) with respect to a flow f  as the sum of the individual 
players’ costs:
C (f) =  ^ C i(f). (2.2)
ieM
Again, we often use C  instead of (7(f). A social cost can also be expressed as the 
sum over all links, of the flow on that link multiplied by the cost of using that link:
C = E  f M f j ) -  (2.3)
j ( E E
With respect to latency functions, our results usually apply to certain subclasses of 
latency functions, that have been considered in the literature and can be listed with a
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formal definition in an incremental order of general form as follows.
• Homogeneous linear function is a linear function of the form £j(fj) =  aj(f j)  where
aj > 0.
• Affine linear latency function is a linear function of the form £j(fj) =  aj(f j)  +  bj 
where aj,bj >  0.
• Polynomial function has a general form of -  a] .d{ f ] ) d +  +
• ■ • +  ) +  aj,o where d is nonnegative integer and a,-0. . . . ,  aJ(l are constant
coefficients where aj d 7̂  0. In particular we consider
— Quadratic function: d =  2.
— Cubic function: d =  3.
— Quartic function: d =  4.
• Convex function.
Since all the above functions are convex, we give a formal definition of convexity as 
follows.
Definition 2.1 .2. [NW99] Convexity
1. S E • n is a convex set if the straight line segment connecting any two points in 
S lies entirely inside S. Formally, for any two points x E S and y E S, we have 
ax  +  (1 — a)y E S for all a E [0,1].
2. f  is a convex function if its domain is a convex set and if for any two points x and 
y in this domain, the graph of f  lies below the straight line connecting (x , f (x ) )  to 
(y ,f{y))  in the space • n+1. That is, we have
f (a x  +  (1 -  a)y) < af(x )  +  (1 -  a)f{y) ,
for all a E [0,1].
For the rest of this thesis, we will assume that for every link j  E E, fj ■ £j(fj) is 
convex. Under this assumption, every cost function C(-) is convex. This gives us a 
useful property which states that any local optimal solution is a global solution in an 
optimisation problem where the objective function is convex (see e.g. Nocedal [NW99]). 
This becomes very useful for the problem of optimising C(-).
We usually assume that links are indexed in increasing order of marginal costs at 
zero flow, i.e. £ j ( 0). For example, links are indexed in increasing order of bj for networks 
with linear latency functions.
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2.2 Optimal Flows
In this subsection, we note some basic facts and behaviours of optimal flows—flows with 
minimal-possible social costs. In [CP91], an optimal flow is called “System Equilibrium” 
(SE). We let f “®  denote an optimal flow.
cp
The objective of f  is to optimise the social cost C (f) =  f j i j ( f j )  of a network.
op ^
Intuitively, when f orj has reached any locally optimal outcome, moving flow from one 
link to another can only increase the cost of f °  . That means that the marginal benefit 
of removing flow from any link is at most the marginal cost of adding flow to any other 
link. Since we assume all cost functions are convex, any local minimum is a global 
minimum. This condition should be necessary and sufficient for to be globally 
optimal. Before we formally formulate this idea, let us define a marginal cost of a given 
latency function ((■).
Definition 2.2.1 . If (.{•) is a differentiable latency function, then the corresponding 
marginal cost function is £'(■) defined by
r\
? { x ) =  (2.4)
Given the definition of marginal cost function, we are ready to formalise an impor­
tant characteristic of the optimal flow in the following proposition. (The proof will be 
omitted. See [BMW55] for a complete proof).
Proposition 2.2.2. [BMW55] Suppose we are given a network G. A flow f  is an 
optimal flow of G if and only if for every j  and k E E with fj > 0, t'Afj) <  C-'fffk)-
Briefly, Proposition 2.2.2 implies that, for a parallel-link network, the marginal cost 
of using link j  is equal to the marginal cost of using link k if both j  and k have non-zero 
flow in the optimal flow in the network.
Next, it will be useful, especially for Chapter 4, to consider a special case of affine 
linear latency networks. Recall that a linear function is of the form ajfj +  bj, for a3 and 
bj > 0. The following lemma shows a characteristic of when the latency functions 
of a network are linear. Recall that w denotes a weight vector ( f 1, . . . ,  f m).
Lemma 2.2.3. [RT02] Suppose we have a network G with affine latency functions 
tj ( f j )  =  ajfj  +  bj, and a weight vector w to be routed on G. An optimal flow of G has 
the property that 2ajfj  -f bj is the same for all links j  on which fj >  0.
Proof. From Proposition 2.2.2, is globally optimal if and only if for all j  and k E E 
that are used, i'j(fj) =  ¿'k{fk)- By Definition 2.2.1, for every link j  and k, we have
,  dtjifj)
h  d f j
+  t j ( f j )  — fk
dlkUk)
d f k
+  Ik ( f k ) -
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In the linear context where l3 (f j)  =  a3 fj +  b3, we are saying that for all j , f3a3 +  a3 f 3 +  bj 
is the same, i.e. the result follows. □
One consequence of the above observation is that all latencies end up within a factor 
of 2 of each other (for links that carry non-zero flow).
Corollary 2.2.4. Let G be a network with affine linear latency functions. If f is an 
optimal flow of G then the maximum latency of links used is at most twice the minimal 
latency of links used, in f .
Proof. Suppose j  is a maximal latency link and k is a minimal latency link in an 
optimal flow of a given network G. If both j  and k carry flow, then, from Lemma 2.2.3, 
2ajfj +  bj =  2akf k + bk. The ratio of the latency of j  to that of k is
aj f j  +  bj _  2a,/,- + b3 -  ajfj _  akf k + b k +  (akf k -  ajfj)  ^
akfk +  bk akfk +  bk akfk +  bk
□
Another useful consequence from Lemma 2.2.3 is that the latency difference between 
the two links that are used in f will end up being half of the difference of their marginal 
costs at zero flow b.
Lemma 2.2.5. Let G be a network with affine linear latencies in the form Iflffl) =  
aj f j  +  bj, and suppose links j  and k both carry flow in an optimal flow of G. 
Assume j  <  k and bj < bk, and f ^  denotes a flow of on link j  e E. Then
4  ( f F ) - * j ( f ? E) =  h(bk - b j ) .
Proof. If j  and k both carry flow, then we noted from Lemma 2.2.3 that 2ajfj +  bj is 
the same for all j. Hence we have,
2 ( 4 ( / feSE) -  w f 3)) = (2ak f F  + 2bk) -  (2a,/SE + 2bj)
=  (2akfkE +  bk) ~  (2a,/,SE +  bj) +  bk -  bj 
— bk bj.
□
Note that Lemma 2.2.5 implies the fact (shown in [HTW06]) that in the homogeneous 
linear case (where all bj ’s are zero) the latencies are equal in an optimal flow. They also 
showed that flows at Nash equilibrium will behave the same. We study the homogeneous
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linear case in details later in Section 4.5 and show that flows at SSL equilibrium have 
the same property.
One consequence from Lemma 2.2.5 is that, if an optimal flow is routed through a
set of links, then, given our assumption that links are indexed in increasing order of A,
SF Jtheir latencies £ j { f j )  are sorted in increasing order of j.
Corollary 2.2.6. Let G be a parallel-link network with linear latency functions, and 
suppose that links are labelled in increasing order ofbj, i.e. j  <  k if bj <  bk. If f  is 
an optimal flow of G then the latencies £j(fj) are sorted in increasing order of j ,  i.e. 
tj ( f j )  <  4 (fk) ifbj < bk.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction proof, that there are two links j  and k such that if 
f  is an optimal flow of a given network G and bj < bk then Ij(f j )  > Ik(fk)-
From Lemma 2.2.5, Ij(f j )  — 4 (/fc) equals (1/2) (bj-bk).  However, from the assump­
tion, (bj -  bk) < 0 which implies that £j(fj) <  4(/fc)- Hence the result follows. □
2.2.1 How to Find an Optimal Flow
In this subsection, we demonstrate how to mathematically compute an optimal flow of 
a given network G.
For general latency functions, we can find an optimal flow by solving the problem 
argminf C'(f). Using linear programming technique and by assuming all cost functions 
are convex and differentiable, the solution to argminf (7(f) can occur either at its sta­
tionary points or at points on its domain boundary. A stationary point is a point where 
the derivative is equal to zero, (see e.g. [MT03] for more details).
Let us demonstrate this with a network of two parallel links. For this case, the 
problem of finding the optimal flow f ®  = ( / ® , / ® )  can be reduced to the problem 
of finding only / ® ,  since, knowing / ® ,  we can obtain / ®  with 1 -  / f® .  Since we 
assume that the total flow is one, the optimal flow must be f f E =  0 or / j ®  =  1 or the 
critical point where dC(f)/dfi =  0. The following steps summarise how to compute an 
optimal flow:
1. Let for (fi)* be the solution to dC(i)/dfi =  0.
2- If (/i)*  is feasible, i.e. 0 <  (/i)*  < /  then / x®  =  ( / x)*.
3. If (/i)*  is infeasible, i.e. / ®  > 1 or / ®  < 0, then either ( / ® )  =  0 or ( / ® )  =  1 
whichever has the lower cost.
Alternatively, we can use Proposition 2.2.2 to find an optimal flow. Again, let us 
demonstrate this with a network of two parallel links.
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1. Compute the marginal cost function ¿[(fi)  and F2( /2).
2. Choose / ®  and / ®  such that =  ^ ( /® ) -
Roughly speaking, to find an optimal flow using Proposition 2.2.2 is to solve for the 
optimal flow on link j  such that the marginal costs of every link j  that carries 
non-zero flow /p E are equal, i.e. ^ ( / j® )  are equal for every j  € E for which /® E > 0.
Specifically for a network with linear latency functions, we can use the property 
stated in Lemma 2.2.5 to find an optimal flow. Assuming that links are sorted in the 
increasing order of bj, we describe the process of obtaining an optimal flow in a network 
of n parallel links as follows.
Imagine an optimal flow increasing from 0 to 1. Initially all the flow will be put on 
link 1, i.e. the link with the lowest constant cost. If link 1 is a fixed cost link then all 
the flow will be allocated to link 1. Or else, according to Lemma 2.2.5, once the flow 
is increased to the point that the latency in link 1 is half the difference of the constant 
cost between link 2 and link 1, that is 4 ( / ® )  =  (b2 -  bfj/2, the optimal flow starts 
using link 2. At this point, the amount of flow of /® E has increased to (b2 -  &i)/(2ai) 
and assigned only to link 1. If link 2 is a fixed cost all further flow will be routed on 
link 2. Otherwise, further flow will be assigned to both of the first two links, at the 
rate that will make those links continue to be increased with equal latency. And once 
the latency of link 2 increases to (63 -  b2)/2, the optimal flow starts using link 3. The 
process continues until all of / ®  is assigned.
The optimal flow prefers links with low constant cost. The following observation 
indicates which links will carry the optimal flow.
Observation 2.2.7. Let G be a parallel-link network with linear latency functions. Let 
j  be the link with the maximal index in the optimal flow of G which has / j ®  > 0. Then
• j  =  j 1 where j' is maximal with J2k=i (fy -  h)/2ay < f  and k is not a fixed 
latency link, i.e. 4  =  a^fk +  bk where ak 0 . Otherwise,
• j  — j '  where j ' is minimal with iy  =  by.
Exam ple 2.2.8. Suppose we are given a two-parallel-link network. Link 1 has the 
latency function of 4 ( / i )  =  2 /i and link 2 has the latency function of £2( / 2) =  1. We 
need to route a flow of one unit from a source to a destination through link 1 and link 2 
with the minimal possible cost. From Definition 2.2.1, the marginal cost of link 1 is Afi 
and 1 for link 2. Hence, if we route a quarter of the flow on link 1 and the rest on link 2 
then, by Proposition 2.2.2, the flow is socially optimal.
Rem ark 2.2.9. We should point out that the computation of an optimal flow for 
network with linear latency functions can be done efficiently (in polynomial time). That 
is, we solve the problem C{i)/di by linear programming.
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2.3 Nash Flows
In this section, we investigate a flow at Nash equilibrium (NE). We shall denote a flow 
at Nash equilibrium (which we sometimes call Nash flow) by
Definition 2.3.1. Let G be a network of m players. A flow f* =  ( ( f 1)* ,. . . ,  ( fm)*) of 
G is at Nash equilibrium if, for every player i,
C* ((f1)*, • • •, (P-1)*, (P)*, (P+1)*,..., (fm)*)
< ((f1)*,..., (P -1)*, P, (P+1)*,..., (f-)*) (2.5)
for every feasible strategy P.
We can look at a Nash equilibrium as the best strategy that each player can play 
based on the given set of strategies of the other players. Such the strategy is known as 
best response strategy which we give the formal definition in the following definition.
Definition 2.3.2. A strategy of player i (P)* is a best response for a given flow f  = 
( f 1, . . . ,  f m) if and only if
c i ( f \ . . . ,  r - \  ( f y , p + \ . . . ,  f m) < &  ( f \ . . . ,  r - \  r , r +1, . . . ,  tm) (2.6)
for every feasible strategy P of player i.
Corollary 2.3.3. A flow f  is at Nash equilibrium if and only if every player i routes 
using the best response strategy (P)*.
From Definition 2.3.3, finding a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to every player i 
solving the problem
argmin Ci ( f 1, . . . ,  P “ 1, f\ f i+1, . . . ,  f m) (2.7)
P
while holding other strategies f k fixed for every k i.
Following from [HTW06], since we assume that cost functions are convex, we can 
state the convex optimality condition that a Nash flow must satisfy. Consider a link j  
and a player i. The cost of i on j  is / j  • i f l fj ) .  Increasing Vs flow on j  increases the 
cost of i at the rate of Lflffl) +  / j  • t ' ( / ?) where £'■(/_,■) is a marginal cost function of £j 
as defined in Definition 2.2.1.
Lemma 2.3.4. [HTW06] A flow f  is at Nash equilibrium, for all links j  and k and for 
all players i that have / j  > 0, if the following inequality holds,
t j ( f i )  +  f )  • W  < 4 (fk) +  fk • 4(/fc).
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It is crucial that, when we talk about a Nash equilibrium, we should clarify the exis­
tence and uniqueness of it. The following proposition was first proved by Harker [Har85] 
using the theory of variational inequalities, and subsequently shown by Orda et al. 
in [ORS93]. The proof relies on the assumption that the cost function must be convex. 
We shall omit the proof (for the complete proof see [ORS93]).
Proposition 2.3.5. [HM85, ORS93] Let G be a parallel-link network for m atomic- 
splittable players with continuous, differentiable, convex cost functions. A Nash flow of 
G must exist.
Remark 2.3.6. A network in our setting could admit more than one Nash flow (See 
Example 2.3.7), it is easy to see that all Nash flow must have the same cost. Borrowing 
term from [Rou02], we claim that Nash flow in our setting is essentially unique.
Example 2.3.7. A network of links parallel links. Both links have a constant cost of 
1. It is easy to see that, regardless of how many players in the network, there are more 
than one Nash flows. However every Nash flow has a social cost of exactly 1.
Next, let us consider the Nash equilibrium of a flow f of a special case of two players. 
Given a network of two players: player 1 and player 2, a flow f* =  ((f1)*, (f2)*) is at 
Nash equilibrium if,
C 1 ((f1)*, (f2)*) < C 1 (f\ (f2)*) and C2 ((f1)*, (f2)*) < C2 ((f1)*, f2) (2.8)
for every feasible strategies f 1 and f2.
This is equivalent to solving two problems, one for each player. Assuming that 
player 2 will play with the feasible strategy (f2)', player 1 solves the problem
argminC1 (f1, (f2)').
f1
Similarly, assuming player 1 will play with the feasible strategy (f1)', player 2 solves 
the problem
argminC2 ((f1) ',^ ) . 
f2
Suppose that player 1 and player 2 obtain (f1)* and (f2)* respectively from solving 
the above problems, (f1)* (respectively (f2)*) is essentially the best response to (f2)' 
(respectively (f1)'). If (f1)* = (f1)' and (f2)* =  (f2)' then the condition in (2.8) is 
satisfied, hence the flow ((Z1)*, ( / 2)*) is a Nash flow.
We have so far considered the case of atomic players. It is useful, especially for the 
final section of this chapter, to formulate a formal definition of a Nash equilibrium of 
a flow of nonatomic players. Following from [CP91], let fUE denote a flow of infinitely
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many players, each of which controls a negligible fraction of the total flow (We sometimes 
refer to this type of flow as UE flow). Each player in fEE follows the Wardrop’s user 
equilibrium principle in its routing decision, which states that, at Nash equilibrium, 
the latencies in all links actually used are equal and less than those which would be 
experienced by a single player on any unused link. The following definition formally 
summarised this idea.
Definition 2.3.8. [RT02] Let G be a network of nonatomic players. A flow f  of G is at 
Nash equilibrium if and only if for every links j  and k € E with f j  > 0, i f l f j )  < f-kifk)-
2.3.1 How to Find a Nash Flow
In this subsection, we demonstrate how to compute a Nash flow f^E  for a two-player 
game in a network with two parallel links. As mentioned earlier, finding the Nash flow 
f^E  =  ^(fi)NE^ (f2)NE^ Qf two-player flow is equivalent to player 1 solving the 
problem
argminC1 ^f1, ( f2)NE^ 
and player 2 solves the problem
argminC2 ^(f1)^E ; f 2j
Since, in two-link networks, knowing the amount of a player flow on one link ob­
viously grants us the player flow on the other link, we shall use f\ instead of f* for 
the strategy of player i. Since when solving the problem argminf, Cl for player i, the 
other player’s flow is fixed, we can use the derivative technique that we described for 
the problem of finding an optimal flow.
Thus, for a two-player case, we will have two conditions so that, if f^E  satisfies, 
both conditions will be necessary and sufficient for f^E  tG be a Nash flow. Let us 
demonstrate this with a simple two parallel-link network with linear latency functions 
in the following example.
Example 2.3.9. Suppose we are given a network of two parallel links. Link 1 has the 
latency of l\ =  2 /i and link 2 has the latency of ti =  1. In addition, we are given a flow 
of two players, each of which has a 1/2 unit of flow to route from the sink node to the 
source node using link 1 and/or link 2. First, we solve the problem argminf i C l ( f 1, f 2) . 
From Definition 2.1.1, player l ’s cost is
C 1 =  / i  ■ 2 (/i +  / 2) +  (^ — / i )  • 1
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because / 2' =  1/2 — / / .  The partial derivative of C 1 with respect to / /  is
dC1 
d fl
= 4 /i + 2 /f -  1.
Equating the result to zero, we get
4 / i  +  2 / i  -  1 =  0 (2.9)
We then solve the problem argminf2 C2 ( f 1, f 2). The cost of player 2 can be written as
C2 = / i  • 2(/i + ft) + (1 -  f 2) • 1,
because / 2 =  1/2 — / 2. The partial derivative of C'2 with respect to / 2 is
d C 1 9 ,
~qJT = 4/i + 2 /i — 1.
Setting the result to zero, we have
4 /i + 2 /i -  1 = 0 (2.10)
For a flow of both players to be the Nash flow, both (2.9) and (2.10) must be satisfied. 
Solving both equations, yields / i  =  f 2 =  1/6. Because both f\ and f 2 are feasible 
(positive and less than the corresponding player’s flow) the flow ((1/6,1/3), (1/6,1/3)) 
is the Nash flow.
2.4 Stackelberg Routing
In this section, we consider another concept of equilibrium. Let us suppose that one of 
the players in M  acts as a leader that will have a priority to route its flow before others. 
After the leader chooses its strategy, the rest of the players—followers—react to the 
strategy, trying to minimise their individual cost with latency functions that have been 
modified by the leader, reaching the Nash equilibrium relative to it. In game theory, 
this is the concept called Stackelberg games. To clarify, in Stackelberg games, the leader 
is not necessarily selfish. As we have mentioned earlier in the Previous Works section, 
there are other related works that consider both benevolent leaders and malicious leaders 
(see Section 1.3 for more details).
Our focus is on a selfish leader. If the leader’s strategy that will optimise the 
leader’s cost after all players have played is f1 =  ( / / , . . . ,  / / ) ,  the followers will take the
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leader’s flow as fixed and minimise their cost with respect to the modified cost— namely 
£j(fj) — £j ( f j  +  f j )  for each j.  A flow is at selfish Stackelberg leadership equilibrium 
(or SSL equilibrium) in two cases. The first is where the number of players m >  2, after 
the leader has played, the followers form an m — 1 Nash equilibrium relative to £j{fj). 
The second where there is a single follower, the follower forms an optimal flow relative 
to £j(fj)• Note that we mainly study SSL equilibrium in the second case. We denote 
such a flow as selfish Stackelberg leadership flow (or SSL flow or We formalise
the idea of the SSL equilibrium in the following definition.
Definition 2.4.1. Given a network G, in which player 1 is a leader and the rest of 
the players (2 to m) are followers, all of which route their flow simultaneously. Let 
player l ’s strategy be f 1 =  ( /* , . . . ,  f j )  that optimise C 1, and let £j(fj) =  £j(fj  +  f j )  
for each link j  € E. The flow f  is at a selfish Stackelberg leadership equilibrium if and 
only if the flow f  of players 2 to m is at Nash equilibrium, or, in the case where m = 2, 
f ' of player 2 is at system equilibrium, with respect to a latency £j(fj) for each j  € E.
Since after the leader has played the modified latency functions retain the prop­
erty to be continuous, differentiable and convex, the existence of the SSL equilibria is 
guaranteed by Proposition 2.3.5.
Proposition 2.4.2. Let G be a parallel-link network of m atomic-splittable players with 
continuous differentiable convex cost functions. The flow of G at SSL equilibrium must 
exist.
2.4.1 The Price of Selfish Stackelberg Leadership
Now that we have defined the SSL equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium, we are ready 
to give the formal definition of the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership that we use to 
quantify the additional social cost that occurs when one of the players acts as a leader. 
Informally, the price of SSL is the worst ratio between the social cost at SSL equilibria 
and that of SSL equilibria.
Definition 2.4.3. Let G be a parallel-link network of m atomic-splittable players. Let
C Q T  ATT?
f and f JV-C/ respectively be the SSL flow and the Nash flow of G. If F is the set of 
all feasible flows of G, the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership in G is defined as
C  ( f  SSL)
sup — \ , /  ■ (2.11)
{SSLjNEeF C ( f NE^
Rem ark 2.4.4. The definition focuses on the additional social cost of SSL setting over 
Nash setting; so we do not define it as C'(f®®^J)/C (f® ^) where denote the optimal
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flow of the corresponding f. However in later chapters, specifically in Chapter 4, we 
often use the ratio (7(fSSL)/^(fSE) to Upper bound the price of SSL.
2.4.2 How to Find a SSL Flow
In this subsection, we demonstrate how to compute a SSL flow for a network of two 
parallel links and two players. To compute the SSL flow we first haVe to determine
what the second player will do.
The Last Player’s Behaviour
We have noted earlier that the last player in a Stackelberg game will act similar to an 
optimal flow. Suppose that player 1 routes with the strategy f 1 =  ( / / , . . . ,  /^). After 
player 1 has played, the latency function on each link has changed to l j ( f j )  =  £j(fj +  f } )• 
Thus, player 2 now has to solve the problem
a rg m in ^ /?2 ■ W
f jeE
Solving the above problem, player 2 obtains f2 which essentially is the best response 
strategy of player 2 with respect to any player l ’s strategy f1.
Alternatively, we can use Proposition 2.2.2, and find the strategy of player 2 such 
that all of the marginal costs of the links used are equal.
Proposition  2.4.5. Let G be a parallel-link network with two players. In the SSL 
setting, assume that the leader routes its flow with f 1, and let =  hjifj +  /  ¡) for
all links j .  Player 2 ’s cost is minimised if for every pair of links j  and k with f 2 >  0;
fyf])<Ufl)-
The next step would be to determine what the first player would do.
The First Player’s Behaviour
Let us denote (f2) , (f1) the solution to the problem argminf2 YljeE fj  ' &(f3) f°r any 
given f 1. The objective of player 1 now is to choose f 1 such that the combined flow 
gives the minimal-possible cost of player 1. That is, player 1 solves the problem
argminC1( f1, ( f2) / ( f1)). 
f1
The next example shows how to find the SSL flow in the two parallel link network with 
linear latency functions.
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Exam ple 2.4.6. Consider the network in Example 2.3.9. That is, we are given a 
network of two parallel links where link 1 has the latency function of 2 /i and link 2 has 
the latency function of 1. We are also given a flow of two players, each of which has 
1/2 unit of flow to route from the source to the sink in the network. Suppose player 1 
routes its flow before player 2. We find the SSL flow in the network.
Firstly, we consider player 2’s behaviour. If player 1 routes with the strategy f 1 =  
(/* , /21), the cost of player 2 is
C 2 =  / i ' 2 ( / 1 +  / f )  +  ( ^ - / 12) - l ,
because / f  =  1/2 — f 2. The partial derivative of C 2 with respect to f 2 is
d c 2
df l
=  4f 2 +  2 /i  -  1.
Equating the result to zero before solving for f 2, we have
■2 1 ~ 2 /j
1 4 ( 2 .12)
Secondly, we consider what player 1 will do. Player 1 knows that if it routes with 
f\ then player 2 will respond with f 2 according to (2.12). Hence, the cost of player 1 is
C 1 — fi  ■ 2 ( /i  + 1 -  2 /j4 ) +  ( l - / i ) - i .
by f i  =  1/2 — / i  and (2.12). The partial derivative of C 1 with respect to f ì  is
dC1 
df i
Setting the derivative to zero and then solve for / i ,  we obtain f i  of 1/4. Furthermore, 
from (2.12), f 2 is 1/8. Hence the SSL flow is ((1 /4,1/4), (1/8, 3/8)).
Combining Examples 2.3.9 and 2.4.6, we show in the following example the price of 
SSL of the network discussed in the previous example.
Exam ple 2.4.7. Consider the social costs obtained in Example 2.3.9 and Example 2.4.6. 
The social cost of the SSL flow is 29/32 and that of the Nash flow is 8/9. Thus, we have 
the price of SSL of approximately 1.019.
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h ( f l )  =  1
W 2 )  =  f2
Figure 2.1: Pigou’s example shows a simple two-node, two-parallel-link network. A 
latency function £(x) describes the cost experienced by a player for using that link.
2.5 Pigou’s Example
In this section, we illustrate the definitions, characterisations and techniques of the 
previous sections in a simple network. We hope that this will not only motivate the main 
problem studied in this thesis, but also distinguish between our work and other works 
studying Stackelberg routing games. We consider the network depicted in Figure 2.1. 
The network was first studied by Pigou in 1920 [Pig20].
Suppose that the latency function of link 1 is £\{f\) =  1 and the latency of link 2 
is £2(12) =  /2- Suppose the total traffic flow is 1, and, in the case where there are two 
players, player l ’s flow / 1 is 2/5 and player 2’s flow / 2 is 3/5. Assume that all players 
aim to minimise an individual cost, unless stated otherwise, of routing a flow from s to 
t by splitting their flow across the links. We compute the routing strategies, which are 
equivalent, to obtain /1 for the one player game and / /  and / /  for the two-player game 
for the following set-ups:
1. A system equilibrium.
2. A user equilibrium.
3. Two atomic players in a Nash equilibrium.
4. Two atomic players in the selfish Stackelberg leadership setting.
5. An atomic leader and a UE follower.
6. A benevolent atomic leader and an atomic follower.
7. A benevolent atomic leader and a UE follower.
8. A malicious atomic leader and an atomic follower.
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9. A malicious atomic leader and a UE follower.
We investigate each set-up in the order listed. In each set-up, we compute the routing 
strategy for each player, its individual cost and the social cost. Table 2.1 summarises 
the results at the end of this section.
2.5.1 A  S ystem  E qu ilibrium
In this first scenario, we compute the optimal flow of the network. Since the latencies 
of the network are affine linear, from Lemma 2.2.3, the strategy of the optimal flow is 
to make the terms 2a-j +  bj the same for both links. That is, 2/ 2 from link 2 must equal 
to 1 from link 1. Routing half of the flow on link 1 and the other half on link 2 equalises 
the terms. Hence the optimal flow is (1/2 ,1/2), which gives the social cost of
C 1 1 1 _  3
2 ' 1 +  2 ' 2 _  4'
2.5.2 A  U ser E qu ilibrium
Next, we consider the nonatomic setting. That is, we investigate the UE flow which has 
an infinite number of players, each of which controls a negligible fraction of the overall 
flow. By Definition 2.3.8, the UE flow f UE is at Nash equilibrium if and only if f UE 
routes all its flow along link 2 which makes the latency of link 1 and link 2 equal.
Alternatively, we can describe f EE as follows. For each selfish nonatomic player to 
ensure the minimal individual cost possible, it routes its flow on link 2. This is because 
the cost of using link 2 is never worse than the cost of using link 1 even when link 2 is 
loaded with all the traffic. (The cost of using link 1 is always 1 and the cost of using 
link 2 when the entire flow is routed on it is 1.) And it is even better when there are 
some foolish players routing their flow on link 1.
In conclusion, by Definition 2.1.1, the social cost is,,
C (fUE) =  h  • € i( /i)  +  h - £ 2( f2) =  0 • 1 + 1 • 1 =  1.
Note that, for any UE flow that is bigger than one in this network, one unit of that 
flow will be routed on link 2 and the rest will be on link 1. This is because if the flow 
on link 2 is less than the flow on link 1 then some players on link 1 will be better off 
deviating to link 2, and if already one unit of flow is on link 2, then any player deviating 
from link 1 to link 2 will be worse off.
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2.5.3 Two Atomic Players at Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection, we consider the scenario in which there are two atomic-splittable 
players. Recall that player 1 has 2/5 of the overall flow and the rest of the flow belongs 
to player 2. To find the Nash equilibrium for this set-up, by Definition 2.3.3, basically 
we want to find a pair of feasible strategies ( / 1)NE and (Z2)NE respectively for player 1 
and player 2 such that
c 1 ((Zi)NE, (/i2)NE) < c*1 (zi, (/i )NE)
and
C 2((/;)NE.(/ i)NE) < ^ ( ( / i ) N E /f)
for every feasible strategy f  \ and f\.
That is, we must solve the optimisation problems argmin^i C^Zi, (Z2)^ E) while 
holding (/i)NE) fixed and argmin^ C'2((/1)NE, Zi) while holding (Zi)NE). The cost 
of player 1 and player 2 can be explicitly written as
c \ f l  (/i2)N E ) =  Z i • 1 +  (Z1 -  Z iX Z 1 -  fi  +  Z2 -  (Zi2)N E ),
and
f l )  = f l  ■ 1 + (Z2 -  Z iX Z1 -  (ZiJ)NE + Z2 -  Zi2).
Substituting Z1 = 2/5 and f 2 = 3/5, we get
C1 =  Zi + (jr-Z i)(l ~ Zi ~ (Zi)NE),
and
C 2 =  Si + ( | - / f ) ( l  -  ( / i ) NB -  f t ) .
The partial derivative of C 1 and C2 with respect to Zi and f l  respectively are
^ = i + <f -  / ; > ( - ! ) + ( - i ) ( i  -  f i  -  (/,2)NE)
=  2 / ;  +  { / f ) NE -  |  (2,13)
and
^  = 1 + ( f  -  /i2)( - i)  + (-1)(1 -  (Zi)NE -  Zi2)
= V l  + (Zi)NE - 1 (2.14)
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Setting (2.13) and (2.14) to zero, we then can solve for ( / j )^ ^  and ( / f ) ^ E . We 
have










In order for the pair of strategies ( fx)NE and ^ N E  to be at Nagb equilibrium, both 
(2.15) and (2.16) must be satisfied. Solving the pair of equations, we get ( / i ) ^ E =  1/15 
and ( / 2)^ E =  4/15. Thus we get the following costs:
c ‘ =  è  ' 1 + + ib =  I  “  °-289’
and
c 2  = i r 1 + b H >  = § * a489-
And the social cost is
13 22 _  7
45 + 45 “  9 «  0.778.
2 .5 .4  T w o  A to m ic  P layers in the SSL S etting
In this subsection, we consider the same set-up as in the previous Subsection 2.5.3, 
except that, in this subsection the game is played in the SSL setting—one of the players 
acts as a selfish leader, routing its flow first and has to commit to the strategy it chooses. 
The other player then allocates its flow to minimise its cost according to the first player’s 
choice. We consider two scenarios in this setting. One is when player 1 is the leader 
and the other is when player 2 is the leader. We determine the SSL flow fSSL wbich as 
noted earlier it is sufficient to find / /  and / 2 at SSL equilibrium.
Player 1 as a leader
Suppose player 1 is a leader. To find what player 1 will do, we have to first determine 
what player 2’s strategy is. Player 2 will have to solve the problem, given that player 1 
previously chooses strategy / / ,  argmin^ C2( /1, / 2). The cost of player 2 is
c \ f l  f t )  =  f t  ■ 1 + ( / 2 -  f t ) ( f l -  f t  + f  ~  f t ) -
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Substituting f l =  2/5 and / 2 =  3/5, we get
<?* =  / ? +  ( § - / ? ) ( !  - / i 1 - / ? ) -
Taking the partial derivative of C 2 with respect to / 2, we get
n r 2
Q js  =  1 +  (| -  / ? ) ( - ! )  +  (-1 )(1  -  / i  -  /i2)
=  2/i2 + / i  -
Setting the result to zero then solving for / 2, we have
/ ? = (2.U)
Secondly, we determine / /  in the SSL flow. Player 1 solves the problem argmin^i C l {f{ ,  / 2), 
knowing that if player 1 routes with / / ,  player 2 will respond with / 2 according to (2.17).
The cost of player 1 is
c \ f l  fl) = / i • l  + (Z1 -  / i)(/x -  Zi + z2 -  Zi).
Substituting (2.17) for Zi, f 1 =  2/5 and / 2 =  3/5, we get
c 1 =  f i  +  (| -
The derivative of C'1 with respect to / i  is
a c 1
dfi i + ( 7 - / i ) ( b  +  ( - i ) ( 7 5 / ;
,2
'5
f i  +  To
10 )
Setting the derivative to zero and solving for f l ,  we obtain the infeasible f l  of -1 /10 . 
Since the cost of player 1 is convex, the feasible f l  in the SSL flow must be equal to 
either 0 or 2/5. When f l  equals to 0 yielding Zi of 3/10 (using (2.17)) which gives the 
cost of player 1 of 0-1 +  (2/5)(2/5 +  3/10) % 0.28. When f l  equals to 2/5 yielding f f  of 
1/10 which gives the cost of player 1 of 2/5 • 1 + 0 • (0 + 1/2) =  0.4. Hence, the SSL flow 
is (0,3/10). And we have the cost of player 2 of (3/10) • 1 +  3/10(2/5 +  3/10) =  0.51. 
Finally, the social cost is 0.28 +  0.51 ss 0.79.
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Player 2 as a leader
Suppose player 2 is a leader. Firstly, we determine what player 1 will do. Given that 
player 2 previously routes with a strategy f l ,  player 1 solves the problem argmin^i C'1( / 1, / f ) .  
The cost of player 1 is
c \ f l  fl) = fi • 1 + (Z1 -  Z iX Z 1 -  z i  +  Z2 -  fl).
By substituting f 1 =  2/5 and f 2 =  3/5, we get
C ‘ = /} +  ( -  -  f-  f l  -  /,2).
Taking a partial derivative of C 1 with respect to f  \. we get 
r)Cl 2
~dfl =  1 + (¡5 ~ Zi)(—1) + (~1)(1 “  Zi ~ Zi2) 
=  2 f l  +  f l - l -
Setting the result to zero then solving for we have
2 -  5Zi 
10 ‘ (2.18)
Secondly, player 2 solves the problem argrninp  C ‘2{f\, f l ) .  Substituting (2.18) into 
C2, we get the cost of player 2 as
C 2 =  fl  +  ( |  -  / ? )( !  -  _  / f)
= / ? + 1| -
The partial derivative of C2 with respect to Zi is






Equating the result to zero then solving the equation, we get Zi =  1/10 therefore,
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by (2.18), f l  — 3/20. Thus, we have the following costs:
c 1 = — ■ i + - ( -  +  - )  27on A ' A O /20
1
4M  ' 2'
and
80 0.337,
„ 1,1 1 19
°  “  IÒ ' 1 +  2 ( 4 +  2> =  40 =  ° '475'
And the social cost is
_  27 19 13
~  80 +  40 ~ 16 ~  ° '812‘
2 .5 .5  A n  A to m ic  Leader and a U E F ollow er
In this setting, we consider the scenario in which the leader (player 1) is an atomic 
player and player 2 is a UE flow. Again, we first determine what the follower will do. If 
player 1 has 2/5 of the total flow then, by Definition 2.3.8, for every strategy of player 1, 
player 2 routes all of its flow on link 2.
For the strategy of player 1 at SSL equilibrium, player 1 solves the problem 
argmin^i f l ) .  By substituting f l  -  0, f 1 =  2/5 and / 2 =  3/5, we have the cost
of player 1 as
c l =  / ;  • i + (~ -  / i ) ( i  -  f i ) .
The partial derivative of C 1 with respect to / /  is 
8C1 2
JJT =  1 +  (5 - / i ) ( - ! )  +  ( - ! ) ( !  ~ f i )
Setting the derivative to zero then Solving the equation, we obtain f l  =  1 /5. The 
resulting flow is ((1/5,1/5), (0, 3/5)). We have the following costs:
c l = \ - i + 1A + l
and
25 =  0.36,
c 2 = ° ' i + M + | ) = i = 0-48-
_9_ 12




The social cost is
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2.5.6 A  Benevolent Atomic Leader and an Atomic Follower
In this subsection, we consider the situation similar to Subsection 2.5.4, in which there 
are two atomic players in the SSL setting. However, in this subsection, we assume 
that the leader is benevolent. That is, the leader’s objective is to allocate its flow to 
entice the other player to route its flow such that the social cost is minimal. Korilis et 
al. [KL097a] studied the more general setting in which there are finitely many atomic 
followers. And, for this setting, they presented the leader strategy that can always 
enforce the optimal flow.
We first consider the situation where player 1 is a leader; then we consider the 
situation where player 2 is a leader.
Player 1 as a benevolent leader
Suppose player 1 is a leader. Recall from Example 2.5.1 that the optimal flow is 
(1/2,1/2). If player 1 routes its flow such that it does not change the latency dif­
ference between link 1 and link 2, i.e. f\ =  2/5, then player 2, who will treat player l ’s 
flow as constant, will act as an optimal flow. By Lemma 2.2.5, player 2 will route 1/10 
on link 1 which makes the combined flow an optimal flow. Therefore we get the following 
costs:
C 1 = | . l  + 0(0 + i )  =  | = 0.4,
and
° 2 =  i r 1 + 5<0 + 5> =  ^ = 0-35-
And the social cost is
Player 2 as a benevolent leader
Suppose player 2 is a leader. Similar to when player 1 is a leader, player 2 will try yo 
allocate its flow such that the latency different between link 1 and link 2 stays the same 
after its turn. That is, player 2 routes 1/2 unit of flow on link 1. Player 1 will act like 
an optimal flow, and, by Lemma 2.2.5, will route all of its flow on link 2. Consequently
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the combined flow is an optimal flow. Thus, we get the following costs
C 1 =  0 • 1 + - • ( -  +  — ) =  -  =  0.2, 
5 v5 1(T 5
and
1 ,2 11
C - 2 ' 1 +  i ò ‘ 5 +  i o )  =  2Ò = ° 55'
And the social cost is
C=l+M=i=°-75-
2 .5 .7  A  Benevolent Atom ic Leader and a UE Follower
In this subsection, we consider a similar setting as the previous subsection, but with 
player 2 as a UE flow. This set-up is commonly studied by many recent works in 
Stackelberg games for example [KS06, Rou04, Swa07].
As usual, we consider what player 2 will do first. For every strategies / / ,  link 2 is 
always better for player 2. Hence, player 2 routes all its flow on link 2. Player 1 aim to 
minimise the social cost. After player 2 has played, the social cost is
C  =  ( f l +  0) • 1 +  (2/5 -  f l  -  3/5) • (2/5 -  f\  -  3/5)
= f l  + (1 -  f l ? -
The partial derivative of C with respect to f\ is
8C
dflT =  2f l  ~ I-
Setting the derivative to zero then solving for / / ,  we get an infeasible f {  of 1/2. Let 
us rewrite C as the following
C =  ( f l ?  - f l  +  i
which essentially is a decreasing convex function for / /  in the range [0, 2/5]. Therefore 
the feasible strategy of player 1 that minimise the social cost must be one of its border, 
namely / /  equals to either 0 or 2/5. Since when / /  equals to 2/5 the social cost is lower 
than that when equals to 0, player 1 routes all its flow on link 1. In conclusion, we
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get the following costs
C 1 =  f  ' 1 +  0(0 + § )  =  !  =  0.4, 
and
C ^ 0 . 1  +  | . ( 0  +  |) =  | k 0.36.
And the social cost is
19
25 0.76.
2.5.8 A  Malicious Atomic Leader and an Atomic Follower
So far, we have considered a benevolent leader and a selfish leader. In this subsection, 
we consider a malicious leader. The objective of the leader is to seek, independently of 
its own cost, to degrade the cost of the total network. In this subsection, we consider 
the scenario in which player 1 is the malicious leader, and player 2 is an atomic follower. 
This is similar to the SSL setting in a sense that player 1 predicts what player 2 do then 
maximise the social cost with regard to the prediction of what player 2 will do. Firstly, 
we consider what player 2 will do. The cost of player 2 is
c 2( f l - / i )  =  I ' 1 +  (| - / ? ) ( § -  A1 + 1 -  /? ).
where / 1 =  2/5 and f 2 — 3/5. Taking the partial derivative of C 2 with respect to f f , 
we have
^  = 1 +  (| -  / ? ) ( - ! )  + ( -1 )0  -  f l  -  /? )
= 2 / ? + / ; - § .
Setting the derivative to zero then solving for f 2, we have
f l  =  (2-19)
Secondly, we determine f l  which is the solution to argmaxyi C ( /1, / / )  where f 2 is 
obtained from (2.19). Substituting (2.19) for f 2, the social cost C  becomes
C = {fl + fl)  • 1 + (i -  f l  -  f l ) 2
10 10
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The partial derivative of C with respect to / /  is
dC 5 -  2
df\ ~  10
Setting the result to zero then solving for f\, we have f\ =  2/5, which implies that 
fi =  3/10. The cost of player 1 and player 2 are
C 1 =  0 - l  +  ( ^ - 0 ) ( l - 0 - ^ )  =  0.28, 
and
And the social cost if given by
C ' = ( °  +  ~ ) - 1 + (1 - 0 - ^ ) 2 =  0.79.
2.5.9  A  Malicious Atomic Leader and a UE Follower
In this final subsection, we still consider the malicious leader, instead, with a UE flow 
as a follower. We know that for every strategies of player 1, player 2 will always route 
all of its flow on link 2. Therefore for player 1 to maximise the social cost, it similarly 
routes all of its flow on link 2. Clearly the cost of player 1 is 2/5, and the cost of player 2 
is 3/5. And the social cost if 1.
2.5.10 Comments
In this subsection, we give some comments based on the results shown in Table 2.1.
1. The ratio of the social cost of the user equilibrium to that of the system equi­
librium is 4/3. This ratio is known as the price of anarchy. Roughgarden and 
Tardos [RT02] showed that the ratio of 4/3 is the tight bound for the price of 
anarchy for a general network with linear latency functions.
2. The social costs of the SSL flow both when player 1 is a leader and when player 2 
is a leader, are higher than the social cost of the Nash flow. In the SSL flow, the 
leaders over-use link 2 forcing the followers to move some of their flows to link 1. 
As a consequence, it turns out that the leaders’ costs are lower, but the followers’ 
costs increase with greater amount, thus increasing the social costs. This fact was 
previously noticed by earlier works, for example Gibson mentioned it in [Gib92] 
for a Cournot competition. For a congestion network game, we initially found this
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observation in [CP91] by Catoni and Pallottino. They studied a network of three 
parallel links where two of them are private links and one is a shared link. Note 
that the network we studied here is somewhat more restrict than that in [CP91] 
in that there are no private links.
3. The ratio of the social cost of when player 1 is a leader to that of the Nash 
equilibrium, and the social cost of player 2 is a leader and that of the Nash 
equilibrium are 1.015 and 1.044 respectively. These ratios demonstrate the price 
of selfish Stackelberg leadership studied in this thesis.
4. The fraction of the total flow a leader has can effect how much the leader benefits. 
As it shows in the comparison between when player 1 is a leader and when player 2 
is a leader. Player 2, who has the bigger fraction of the total flow, reduces more 
of its per-unit cost than player 1 does. That is, when player 1 is a leader, it 
reduces (0.009)/(2/5) «  0.0225 while player 2 reduces (0.014)/(3 /5 ) «  0.0233 in 
the set-up 4.2.
5. Comparing the cost of the leader when a follower is a UE flow to that of when a 
follower is an atomic player shows that having an atomic follower can be better off 
for the selfish leader. We believe this is in fact true in general, in a sense that an 
atomic follower reacts more responsively to a leader’s strategy than a UE follower 
as shown in a few examples in which a UE flow completely disregards a leader’s 
strategy.
6. For a benevolent leader, with regard to the leader’s objective, an atomic follower 
is preferred. When a follower is a UE flow, the leader’s strategy is insignificant to 
the follower. As a result, the the leader cannot ensure that the combined file is 
optimal. This is previously noticed by Roughgarden [Rou04]. 7
7. The idea of a benevolent leader has been studied by many recent works as a tool to 
mitigate selfish users, for example Roughgarden [Rou04] who studied a network in 
which a follower is a UE flow, and Korilis et al. [KL097a] and Orda et al. [ORS93] 
who studied a network with atomic followers.
2.5.11 Conclusion
A few conclusions can be drawn from the study in this subsection. First of all, we have 
reaffirmed that there are price of SSL (Comment 3). Moreover, we have observed that, 
in this particular example, when a leader has more flow in the system, the price of SSL 
gets higher. Clearly, this observation is not always true, as when the leader flow get 
much higher than the follower flow, the price of SSL will get closer to 1.
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Another interesting observation from this study when comparing benefits that lead­
ers obtain between infinitely many followers and a single follower, is that, a leader will 
prefer atomic followers because they react more responsively to leader’s strategies. This 
implies that leaders can enforce strategies easier than infinitely many followers which 
often completely neglect leader’s strategies.
Set-up Description f l /i2 h C 1 C 2 Social Cost
1. System equilibrium - - 1/2 - - 0.75
2. User equilibrium - - 0 - - 1
3. Two atomic players in NE 1/15 4/15 1/3 0.289 0.489 0.778
4.1 Two atomic players in SSL 
(player 1 as a leader)
0 3/10 3/10 0.28 0.51 0.79
4.2 Two atomic players in SSL 
(player 2 as a leader)
3/20 1/10 1/4 0.337 0.475 0.812
5. Atomic leader and UE follower 1/5 0 1/5 0.36 0.48 0.84
6.1. Benevolent atomic leader and 
atomic follower (player 1 as a leader)
2/5 1/10 1/2 0.4 0.35 0.75
6.2 Benevolent atomic leader and 
atomic follower (player 2 as a leader)
0 1/2 1/2 0.2 0.55 0.75
7. Benevolent atomic leader and 
UE follower
2/5 0 2/5 0.4 0.36 0.76
8. Malicious atomic leader and 
atomic follower
0 3/10 3/10 0.28 0.51 0.79
9. Malicious atomic leader and 
UE follower
0 0 0 2/5 3/5 1
Table 2.1: Routing strategies and their corresponding costs in the Pigou’s example
Chapter 3
The Price of Selfish Stackelberg 
Leadership: Lower Bound from 
Examples
In Chapter 2, we have demonstrated that in a network of two parallel links and two 
selfish players each with a splittable flow, there might be an additional cost arising 
when allowing one of the players to have a Stackelberg leadership, in comparison to 
the social cost of Nash equilibrium. In this chapter, we show furthermore how much 
the additional cost can be in that simple network setting. In other words, what is 
the maximal price of SSL? We look at the problem of optimising the price of SSL of 
the following network configurations: a two-parallel-link network with latency functions 
that are linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic, and a three-parallel-link network in which 
two of the links are private links and one is a shared link, and each link has a linear 
latency function. For each configuration, we show an example that demonstrates the 
maximal price of SSL we obtained. These examples offer lower bounds for the price of 
SSL. We show in the next chapter an upper bound to match the lower bound of the 
network with two parallel links, each of which has a linear latency function.
3.1 Overview
Computing the price of SSL from examples shown in the previous chapter, we have 
noticed that with different coefficients of latency functions and a different fraction of 
player flows, prices of SSL are different. For example, in Example 2.4.7 where the 
latency of link 1 is ¿i ( / i )  =  2 /i and the latency of link 2 is ¿2(/2) =  1, and each player 
has 1/2 unit of flow, we obtained the price of SSL of 1.019. However, in the Pigou’s 
Example where =  / 1; ¿2C/2) =  1, the leader flow is 3/5 and the follower flow is
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2/5, we obtained the different price of SSL of 1.044 (comment 3 in Subsection 2.5.10). 
So it raises the following questions that lead us to the problem studied in this chapter:
• How to choose coefficients in linear latency functions and a fraction of player flows 
that have maximised the price of SSL?
• How much worse can the price of SSL be for some networks that have more general 
latency functions? e.g. quadratic etc.
In this chapter, we look at the problem of optimising the price of SSL with respect to 
the coefficients and the fraction of player flows of simple networks with different forms of 
latency functions. Our focus is on simple networks of various network configurations. We 
consider both symmetric and asymmetric networks. A symmetric network is a network 
in which every players have access to all the links, while an asymmetric network is a 
network in which each player does not have an access to all the links. We consider 
the simplest network of its kind—that is we study a network of two parallel links for 
a symmetric network, and a network with one shared link and two private links for 
an asymmetric network. We assume throughout this chapter that there are two selfish 
players; player 1 and player 2, each with a splittable flow to be routed through the 
networks. Player 1 (the leader in the SSL setting) controls a fixed flow of one unit while 
player 2 controls f 2 > 0 units of flow (as can be assumed by re-scaling).
We study networks with four different forms of latency function. For the symmetric 
network, we consider the networks with latency functions that are linear, quadratic, 
cubic and quartic. For the asymmetric network, we consider the network with linear 
latency functions. Given coefficients of latency functions and player 2’s flow of each 
network configuration, we optimise the price of SSL. This can be described by a simple 
example as follows. Suppose we are given a network of two nodes connecting by two 
parallel links with the latencies h ( f i )  =  eq • ( / i )  and £2( f2) =  b2 for some ai,b2 >  0. In 
the network, there are two players in which player l ’s flow is fixed at one and player 2’s 
flow is / 2 > 0. The aim is to try to find a set of constants a\,b2 and / 2 such that the 
price of SSL is maximised.
To solve the optimisation problem, we use an adapted Hill climbing technique (see 
for example [RN03] for more details). Hill climbing technique is appealing for several 
reasons. The most important one is that it is relatively simple to implement. Although 
there are other more advanced algorithms that may be more efficient, in our situations 
hill climbing works reasonably well. We discuss the main algorithm which uses the 
adapted Hill climbing in Section 3.2.1.
Aside from the optimisation technique, another important problem to consider is the 
computation of the price of SSL for a network of two players. That is, given a specific
3.2. ALGORITHM DETAIL 45
network model with a set of coefficients and a fraction of player flows, we determine 
the price of SSL. By Definition 2.4.3, the computation of the price of SSL is essentially 
the problem of computing the social costs of a Nash flow and that of a SSL flow. We 
describe how to obtain player strategies at Nash equilibrium and SSL equilibrium in 
Section 3.3. Algorithm for finding the price of SSL is discussed in Subsection 3.2.2.
The maximal price of SSL we obtained for each network configuration can be sum­
marised as follows (Table 3.1 at the end of the chapter provides the summation in a 
table form). In Section 3.3.1, we consider a symmetric network of two nodes, two paral­
lel links shown in Figure 3.1. We study the network with affine linear latency functions 
of which the highest price of SSL we obtained, which is shown in Example 3.3.1, is 
approximately 1.071. We study the network where the latency of the one of the link is 
quadratic and that of the other link is constant. The maximal price of SSL we obtained 
is a multiplication factor 1.14 which is shown in Example 3.3.2. For the network where 
one of the link has a cubic latency function and the other link has a constant latency 
function, we obtained the price of SSL of approximately 1.177. For the network in 
which one of the link has a quartic latency function and the other one has a constant 
latency function, we obtained the price of SSL of 1.323. In Subsection 3.3.2, we consider 
an asymmetric network of two nodes three parallel links where each link has a linear 
latency function shown in Figure 3.4. The network has two private links each of which 
is used exclusively by the assigned player, and one shared link. We obtain the price of 
SSL of approximately 1.074 which is shown in Example 3.3.5.
Remark 3.1.1. Since the networks with quadratic, cubic and quartic latency functions 
we consider have some restrictions, the maximal price of SSL obtained for them are not 
necessary the maximal for the network with general latency functions in each setting. 
However, we have noticed from some simple examples and from the network with linear 
latency functions that in a network of two parallel links, the price of SSL tends to be 
higher if one of the link has a constant latency function which is the reason why in our 
set-ups for the networks with quadratic, cubic and quartic latency functions, we have 
one of the link be a constant latency function link.
Remark 3.1.2. The price of SSL of 1.071 obtained in Example 3.3.1 corresponds to 
an upper bound of 1.322 given in Section 4.4.
3.2 Algorithm Detail
Let G be a parallel-link network in which each link has a general latency function form 
°f =  aj,d(fj)d +  aj,d-i{fj )d~X +  • • • +  aj,i(fj) +  dj,o where d is nonnegative integer
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Figure 3.1: A simple symmetric network of two nodes, two directed links.
and a,j,o,. . . ,  aj^ are constant coefficients. Let er denote a vector of constants (a,->d, / 2) 
for all d of all j ,  and / 2 corresponds to the player 2’s flow. Recall that by rescaling 
we can assume player l ’s flow fixed at 1. The basic idea of the algorithm is to perform 
a local search for a until we find the maximal price of SSL or a higher price of SSL 
can be found from our set-up. The program are separated into two main parts. One 
is to control a local search, and the other is to compute the price of SSL. The former 
is managed in the main algorithm shown in Figure 3.2, and the later is achieved in the 
POS algorithms shown in Figure 3.3.
3.2.1 The M ain Algorithm
The objective of the main algorithm is to alter parameters, i.e. coefficients of latency 
functions and player 2’s flow (recall that player l ’s flow is fixed at 1), that initially 
generated at random, such that we move toward a set of parameters that produces a 
higher price of SSL.
Initially, we randomly generate a (thus probably a bad one). We compute the price 
of SSL of every neighbours of cr. A neighbour of er is cr with one of the constants changed 
by the value step given from the input. If k is the number of constants in cr, we compute 
the price of SSL of 2k neighbours of a. The computation of the price of SSL is handle 
with the function POS(). Subsequently, we move to the neighbour with the highest 
price of SSL if it is greater than that of cr. By repeating this process, we are essentially 
improving the solution a little bit each time.
Unfortunately, similar to Hill climbing, there are a few disadvantages on the main 
algorithm that we have to overcome. One of the commonly known disadvantage is that 
sometimes we reach a point where no better neighbour can be found even though it is 
not an optimal point. This is known in the field of optimisation algorithm as a plateau 
which occurs when we reach a “flat” part of a search space, i.e. a part where the quality 
of all the solutions are all very close together. To get out of this flat point we consider 
different neighbours that can be further away from a current cr and neighbours that 
have more changes to its constants. That is, instead of considering neighbours that
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Input: step, loop.
Repeatedly, do the following for the number loop times:
1. Randomly generate o =  (ajtd, f 2).
2. o* =  0.
3. Let k be the number of members in o.
4. Repeatedly do the following:
(a) A neighbour of cr is cr that has one of the constants added 
or subtracted with step.
(b) Let N  be an array of size 2k for all neighbours of o.
(c) Let S be an array of size 2k.
(d) From * =  0 to 2k -  1
S\i] =  POS(Ar[z]).
(e) Let o' — max(S').
(f) If o' > O ,  cr =  o'.
(g) Else, repeat the following steps for loop times or until o', 
defined below, is found:
• Let o' be cr which has all constants, each is added 
with a random value in the range of [—2step, 2step}.
• If POS(cr') > POS(cr), o  — o' then return to step 4a.
5. If o' > a*, a* =  o '.
Return o*.
Figure 3.2: A main algorithm for optimising the price of SSL.
have only one constant changed with fixed value step, we consider neighbours that each 
has every constants change by a random value in the range [ -2 step, 2step\. This process 
is repeated for the number of loop. If still no neighbour with a higher price of SSL is 
found, we restart with a new initial cr.
step indicates how much difference the neighbours of cr we consider. It is also used 
in the process of trying to get out of a flat point. Hence, step is an important parameter 
to try to avoid the plateau problem. If the step is set too small, we are more likely to 
experience the plateau problem and the algorithm can take a very long time to run. If 
the step is too big, we could miss out on paths that might lead to an optimal solution. 
For each network configuration, we test three different values of step—0.001, 0.01 and 
0 . 1.
Another disadvantage to the main algorithm is that there is no guarantee that the
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solution we obtain is the global optimum. To try to overcome this problem, we repeat 
the algorithm as many times as possible. By repeating the algorithm, we increase the 
chance of reaching an optimal point. The input variable loop is used to indicate how 
many times we run the algorithm. We use loop =  10, 000 for symmetric networks with 
linear and quadratic latency functions, and an asymmetric network with linear latency 
functions. We use loop =  1000 for the network with cubic and quartic latency functions.
The value of the initial random a is also very important. Intuitively, we want to 
start with values a as close to an optimal solution as possible. The constants a] Ci and 
/ 2 in a are initialised randomly from a reasonable range. For example, for a,, ,] of a 
link that has only a fixed cost, aJ C[ should not be initialised with such a high value that 
both players only route their flow on the other link at both Nash equilibrium and SSL 
equilibrium.
3.2.2 Algorithm for Finding the Price of SSL for Two-player Games
Recall that, for a network of two links, the strategy of player 1 f 1 = (/*, / j2), and the 
strategy of player 2 f2 =  ( / f ,  / f ), can be decreased to f {  and f\ respectively since f\ 
and / !  can be obtained with / 1 — f\ and / 2 — f 2.
1. Computing Player strategies at Nash equilibrium.
We formulate the expressions of player strategies at Nash equilibrium in terms 
of the constants of a. As mentioned in the previous chapter, finding the Nash 
equilibrium of two-player games is equivalent to finding the optimal strategies 
for each player while holding the other player’s strategy fixed. By solving the 
problems, dC1 /df{ ~  0 and dC2/df2 =  0 we obtained the optimal strategies. Let 
us denote for the rest of this chapter the optimal strategies for player 1 and player 2 
that are computed using the derivatives with ( / / ) ^ E and ( / 2) ^E respectively. 
This means that the flow ^ ( /i)NE, { f 2)NE)  is at Nash equilibrium. In addition, 
by solving dC1 /df\ =  0 and dC2/df2 =  0 individually, we obtain the optimal 
strategies for each player with respect to the other player’s strategy. Let us denote 
for the rest of this chapter the optimal strategy of player 1 with respect to any 
given f l  with (f\) .  Similarly, let ( / 2) denote the optimal strategy of player 2 with 
respect to any f\ .
2. Computing Player strategies at SSL equilibrium.
We wish to find the strategies ( / i ) ^ L and ( / 2)®^E such that the cost of player 1 
is minimal and ( / f ) ^ E is the strategy for player 2 that optimises its cost with 
respect to (see Section 2.4). Since ( / 2) ^ L depends on ( / i ) ^ L , the
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Given a =  (ajjd, f 2),
1. Compute (/i)N E  anc| (/^ N E  using the expressions shown later in this chapter.
(a) If 0 < ( f l ) ^ E < 1 and 0 < ( / 2)^ E < f 2,
i. Let CNE =  C ( ( / i ) NE, (/| )NE)
(b) Else if ( ( / i ) NE < 0 or ( f l ) NE > l )  and ( ( / f ) NE < 0 or ( / 2)NE > /a ) ,
i. Let CNE =  C SSL.
(c) Else,
.  if ( f i f E > i, (fly =  i  or if ( f l f E < o, (fly = o.
.  Let ( f l )  =  ( f l f E.
• Let ( fl)* =  (fl).
.  If ( f 2f E > f 2, ( f l y  =  f 2 or if ( / :2)NE < 0, ( f l y  =  0.
.  Let ( f l )  =  ( f l f E.
• Let (fl)* =  (fl).
• Repeatedly do the following until ( f l ) '  =  (fl)*  and ( f 2)' =  (fl)*,
i. if ( f l y  y  ( f l y ,
A. Compute ( f l )  with respect to (fl)'.
B. If ( f l )  > f 2, ( f l y  =  f 2, or if ( f l )  <  0, ( f l y  =  0.
C. Let ( fl)* =  ( f l y  and ( fl)* =  (fl).  
h. Else if ( f l y  y j f i y ,
A. Compute ( f l )  with respect to ( f 2)1.
B. If ( f l )  >  1, ( f l ) '  =  1, or if ( f l )  <  0, ( f l y  =  0.
C. Let ( fl )* =  ( f l )  and (/?)*  =  (fl)'.
• Let CNE =  C(( f l ) ' , ( f l ) ' ) .
2. Let (C1)* be a high number, and ( / 1)®®E =  0 and ( f l ) ^ E =  0.
3. For f l  =  0 to 1, f l  =  f l  +  0.01 :
(a) Compute ( f 2) with respect to f l .
(b) If ( f l )  > f 2, ( f l )  =  f 2, or if ( f l )  < 0, ( f l )  =  0.
(c) Let (C1)' =  C1 ( f l , ( f l ) ) .
(d) If (C1)' < (C 1)*, (C 1)* =  (C1)', ( f l f SL =  f l  and ( / 2)SSL =  ( f 2).
4. Let CSSL =  C ( ( f l ) SSL, ( f l ) SSL)-  
Return CSSL/C NE.
Figure 3.3: The POS algorithm computes the price of SSL for a given a.
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problem becomes one variable problem. It is unnecessary (and can be quite com­
plicated) to formulate the explicit expressions for SSL equilibrium similar to Nash 
equilibrium. The only expression required is the optimal strategy of player 2 with 
respect to any given i.e. ( j f )  which we will already obtain in the process of 
computing Nash equilibrium.
POS algorithm
POS algorithm depicted in Figure 3.2.2 compute a price of SSL for any given set of 
parameters. The computation is done via two steps, first is to compute the social cost 
of SSL flow and then the social cost of NE flow. The detail description of POS() is as 
follows.
Firstly, POS() computes a social cost at Nash equilibrium. As mentioned above, if 
both ( / i ) NE and ( / X2)NE are feasible, it simply computes C ( ( f i ) ^ ,  ( / 2)NE) for the 
social cost at Nash equilibrium. If both ( / 1)NE and ( / 2)NE are infeasible, we return 
the price of SSL of 1.
If one of the strategies is infeasible, we readjust the strategies as follows. For 
i =  { M } ,  if f {  > P  then set f {  to /*, and if f {  <  0 then set f\ to 0. Step lc  reas­
sures that we obtain the feasible strategies (f\)' and ( / 12)/, such that C 1 ( ( / / ) ' ,  ( / f ) ')  < 
C \ f l  (A2)') and C 2( ( /1)', ( / 2)') < C 1 ( (fi)' , f f )  which, by Definition 2.3.3, guarantees 
that ( (f lY, (fi )' )  is at Nash equilibrium.
Secondly, POSQ computes the social cost at SSL equilibrium. We use a brute force 
search for feasible strategies ( / 1)^^E and ( / 2)®®E, such that C'1( ( /1)^^E, ( / 2)®^E) 
where ( / 2)S®E is computed from the expression ( / f ) ,  which implies that (/f)^® E is the 
strategy of player 2 which optimises its cost with respect to ( / i ) ^ E.
3.3 The Computation of the Price of SSL
As mentioned earlier, we find four expressions; ( / i ) NE, ( / 2)NE, ( f i )  and i f f ) ,  for each 
network configurations.
3.3.1 Symmetric Networks
In this section, we focus on the symmetric networks of one single source node and one 
single destination node connected by two parallel links, shown in Figure 3.1.
Affine Linear Latency Functions
We consider the network with a non-decreasing linear latency function of the form 
P  (f j ) =  a,jfj + bj where cij, bj >  0. Since the price of SSL is 1 in a network, where every
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link has homogeneous latency function (as we will show in Section 4.5), our focus here 
is on a scenario where at least one latency function is a nonhomogeneous linear, i.e. at 
least one of the links has bj >  0.
Firstly, we obtain player strategies ( / i ) NE and ( / 12)NE by solving the equations 
dC1 /dfl =  0 and dC2 /d f  f =  0. We consider the cost experienced by player 1:
c H / i )  =  £ / > , ( / / +  / / )  + &,)
jeE
which (for two links) can be explicitly written as
fi  (ai ( / i  +  f i )  +  h )  +  (1 -  f i )  (02(1 -  /i1 +  f 2 ~ f i ) +  b2)
where we substitute f\ and f 2 with 1 -  f\ and f 2 -  f f  respectively. Differentiating C 1 
with respect to /* , we obtain
dC1
W i
j  — 2(ai +  a2) f l  +  (ax +  a2) f 2 +  b\ — b2 — (2 +  f 2)a2.
Equating the derivative to zero then solving for ( / ( )  we have
(~n\ =  -¿>1 +  b2 -  ax • f\ +  a2(2 -  f 2 +  / 2) 
1 2(ax + a2)
Next we consider the cost of player 2:
(3.1)
C2(h )  — ^  f j ( aj ( f j  +  f f  ) +  bj)
j e E
which can be explicitly written as
fi  (ai ( / i  +  f i )  +  1̂) +  i f 2 -  f i )  («2(1 -  f l  +  f 2 -  f 2) + b2)
where similarly we substitute f 2 and / 2 with 1 -  f {  and / 2 -  f (  respectively. Differen­
tiating C 2, we get
dC2
-^2 =  &i -  +  Oi/x1 +  2ox • f l  +  a2( - l  +  /x1 +  2 /21 -  2 /2)
Setting the derivative to zero then solving for ( / 2) we have
/T2x _  Q2 ~ bi +  b2 -  ax • / /  -  a2f l  +  2a2/ 2 
1 2(ax +  a2) (3.2)
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Solving the pair of (3.1) and (3.2), we obtain the strategies for a flow at Nash equilibrium
as
The following example shows a lower bound on the price of SSL in a network with 
linear latency functions.
Example 3.3.1. Consider the network of two nodes and two parallel links shown in 
Figure 3.1. Let us suppose that the latency of the upper link is h ( f i )  =  2.46/i +  0.01 
and the latency of the lower link is (-2U2) =  4.92. Player 1 controls a flow of one unit 
while player 2 controls a flow of 0.59 unit. The flow at Nash equilibrium is (0.70, 0.59)) 
with the social cost of approximately 5.58. The flow at SSL equilibrium is (1.00,0.50)) 
with the social cost of approximately 6.00. Hence the price of SSL in this example is 
»  1.075.
Quadratic Latency Functions
We consider the network model for the following configuration. From Figure 3.1, the 
latency of the upper link is i\(fi) =  (/1)2 +  a (/i)  where a >  0 and the latency of the 
lower link is ¿2(h )  — c where c > 0. This is generally achieved by rescaling. The 
assumption that some link has only a fixed cost means that the result may not be 
optimal for general quadratic functions.
The cost experienced by player 1 in this case is
C \ h )  =  / i ( ( / i  +  /i2)2 +  a ( /i  +  /? ) )  +  (1 -  / i )c .
Taking the derivative of C 1 with respect to f\ we get
- c  + a(f{ + ft) + {fl + f 2)2 + f\(a + 2{f\ + fl)). (3.3)
Setting the result to zero then solving for f\, we get
Since f l  must be positive, thus the only feasible ( f l )  is
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Next, we consider the cost of player 2,
C \ h ) = /i ((/i + f l ) 2 + a(/i + /i2)) + ( /2 -  fl)c.
Taking the derivative of C 2 with respect to / 2, we get
—c + a(/i + f i )  + (/i + / 2)2 + f i ( a  +  2 ( f l  + f l ) ) .  (3.4)
Setting the result to zero, then solving for / 2, we get
(7?) =  l  ( - «  -  2 / i  ±  V/a2 + 3c +  a /1 +  ( / 1)2^ .
Similarly, since / 2 must be positive, the only valid result from the above equation is
( / l ) =   ̂ a ~  ^/i1 +  ^/a2 +  3c +  a/j1 + (/^ )2̂  .
Setting (3.3) and (3.4) to zero then solving for f l  and / 2, we get
/i1 =  f l  =  ^  ( -3 a  ±  ^ g a2 + 32c) .
Since a, c > 0, the only feasible solution is
( / i ) NE =  (/i2)NE =  ^  ( -3 a  + V/9a2_-T32c) .
Example 3.3.2. Modifying the network from Example 3.3.1, let us suppose that the 
latency of the upper link is h ( f i )  =  / 2 +  O.Ol/j and the latency of the lower link is 
(-2U2) =  1-38. Player 1 controls a flow of one unit while player 2 controls a flow of 
0.35 unit. The flow at Nash equilibrium is f NE =  (0.45,0.35)) with the social cost 
of approximately 1.277. The flow at SSL equilibrium is f ^ L — (0.65,0.28)) with the 
social cost of approximately 1.393. Hence the price of SSL in this example is 1.091.
Cubic Latency Functions
Let us modify the network Figure 3.1 by letting the upper link have a latency =
( f l)3 +  a ( /i )2 for a > 0, and the lower link to have a latency hif'i)  =  c for c > 0.
Now we obtain the Nash flow by solving the problems dCl/df\ =  0 and dC2/dff =  
0, for f l  and / 2. The cost of player 1 is
C*1 = fl((f\ + f l ) 3 + a(fl + f l ) )  + (1 -  fl)c.
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Differentiating and equating the result to zero, we get
- c  +  a(fl + f i )  +  (fl +  / i ) 3 +  fl (a +  3 ( /1 +  fl)2) =  0. (3.5)
Solving (3.5), we obtain (f±) as
( /Ï ) -
-24 a +  9 ( ft )2 \ 2
622/3 (432c + 216a/2 + 54(/2)3 + 2y j(24a -  9 (/2)2)3 + 729 (8c + 4a /2 + ( / 2)3):
1/3
+





Next, we consider the cost experienced by player 2:
C2 =  f i ( ( f i  +  f i )3 +  o ( / i  +  /i2)) +  ( / 2 -  / 2)c
Differentiating and equating the result to zero, we get
- c  +  a(f\ +  f l )  +  ( f l  +  f f ) 3 +  f l  (a +  3 ( /i  +  / f ) 2) =  0 (3.6)
Solving (3.6), we obtain
i f !
-24a +  9 ( /f )l\2
622/ 3 ^432c +  216a/]1 +  54(/1)3 +  2 ^ (24a -  g t /1)2)3 +  729 (8c +  4 a /1 +  (Z1)3) 2
1/3
+





Solving (3.5) and (3.6), we obtain the expressions for (/j1)^® and ( / 2)^® as
t ,^N E  _  , ^ N E  _  52/3a -  +  Va3 + 5c2 -  5c)2/3
l / l l  — Oi l  — i „ =----------•
10 v  \/5\/a3 +  5c2 — 5c
Example 3.3.3. Consider the modification of Example 3.3.2 by replacing the latency 
function of the upper bound from the quadratic function to the cubic function ¿i(fi)  =  
( f i)3 and the latency of the lower link to ¿2(h )  =  4.95. Again, player 1 has one unit of
3.3. THE COMPUTATION OF THE PRICE OF SSL 55
flow while player 2 has 0.628 units. At Nash equilibrium, player 2 puts all of his flow on 
the upper link. Player 1 routes the same amount on the upper link. At SSL equilibrium, 
player 1 routes all of his flow on the upper link, pushing player 2 to put 0.39 unit of his 
flow on the lower link. As a result, the social cost of Nash and at SSL equilibrium are 
~  4.323 and ~  4.913 respectively. Hence the price of SSL is at least 1.135.
Q uartic Latency Functions
Our final result for a symmetric network is the network with a latency function of a 
degree of, at most, four. Let us suppose that, in the network shown in Figure 3.1, the 
upper link has a latency h { f i )  =  ( / i ) 4 +  a ( /i )3 where a > 0 and the lower link has a 
latency ¿2(h )  =  c. First we obtain the expression f {  and f\ at the Nash equilibrium 
by solving the two equations dC^/dfl =  0 and dC2/dff  =  0. The cost experienced by 
player 1 is
C1 = / i ( ( / i  + A2)4 + a(fi + f 2) + (1 -  fi)c.
Differentiating C 1 and then equating the result to zero, we get
+ ( / /  + /i2)2 (5 (/i)2 + Qflfl + { f t )2 + a(4fl + f 2)) = 0. (3.7)
Solving (3.7) for (/■(), we obtain
{ f t  =  J ( - o  -  4f t  -  ~ ^ =  ( y / ( - W i ( a +  2f t  +  12(a +  4 f t 2 -  (532/3(20c
-  3a2{ f t 2))/g +  5&!*g)) +  ^ ( - f / i 2(a +  V t  +  ¿ ( a  +  4f 2)2 +  (20c
-  3a2(/i2)2)/(531/3ff) -  — ^ g  + (4V3(4a3 + 3a2/ 2 -  3a(/2)2 -  4 (/2)3)) 
/(25V (-90/2(a + 2 /2) +  12(a + 4 /2)2 -  (532/3(20c -  3a2{ f 2)2))/g +  SS1/ 3̂ )))
where
g =  ( -7 2 a2c -  36ac/2 -  72c(/2)2 -  9a3( / 2)3 + 273(c(72a2c ( / 2)2 +  108a5( / 2)3 
+  432ac(/2)3 + 27a4 (16c + 7 ( /12)4) +  16c(125c +  27 ( / f ) 4)
+  108a3(4c/12 + ( / 2)5)))1/2)i/3.
Next, we consider the cost of player 2
C2 =  /l2(( /Ì  +  f i t  +  *{f\ +  f t )  +  i f 2 ~ f t c .
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Taking the derivative of C2 with respect to f 2 and set the result to zero, we obtain 
- c  +  ( / i  +  /i2)2 ((/i1)2 +  6/1/1 +  5(/i2)2 +  a(f l  +  4f 2)) =  0. (3.8)
Solving 3.8 for ( / 2), we get
(7F) = § ( " «  -  4 /i) -  ^ = (V ( -9 0 / i ( a  + 2/x) + 12(a + 4 /i )2 -  (532/3(20c
-  3a2( f i ) 2))/g +  53 ^ g ) )  +  f l (a  +  2f\) +  ~ ( a  +  4 / 4)2 +  (20c
-  3a2( / 1)2)/(531/35) -  ^ g +  (4^3(4a3 +  3a2 f \ -  3a{f\)2 ~  4( / i ) 3))
/ ( 2 5 ^ (-9 0 /1(a +  2fl)  +  12(a +  4 / 4)2 -  (532/3(20c -  3a2( f l ) 2))/g +  53Wg)))
where
g =  ( -7 2 a2c -  36acfl -  72c(/1)2 -  9a3( / 1)3 + 2x/3(c(72a2c ( / i ) 2 + 108a5( f l )3 
+ 432ac(/1)3 + 27a4(16c + 7 ( /1)4) +  16c(125c +  27(/1)4)
+ 108a3(4c/i +  ( / i ) 5)))1/2)1/3.
Then, solving (3.7) and (3.8) yields the expressions ( /i )^ ®  and ( / 2)^® of which 
both are equal to
¿ ( - 5 a -  (25a2 +  (24(-16c +  (-25a2c +  ^/c2(625o4 +  4096c))2/ 3) ) /( -2 5 a 2c 4o
+  \/ c2(625a4 +  4096c))1/ 3)1/2 +  24((25a2)/288 +  (2c)/(3 (-25a2c 
+  \Jc2(625a4 + 4096c))1/ 3) -  l/2 4 (-2 5 a 2c +  ^ c 2(625a4 + 4096c))(l/3 ) +  (125a3)/ 
(6912((25a2)/576 +  (-16c + (-25a2c + \/c2(625a4 +  4096c))2/3)/(24 (-2 5a2c 
+  \J c2(625a4 + 4096c))1/3) )1/2))1/2).
Exam ple 3.3.4. Consider a network from Example 3.3.2 where we change the upper 
link’s latency function and the lower link’s latency to £\{fi) =  ( / i ) 4 +  0.17/i and 
(■2U2) — 1-96, respectively. Player 1 as usual controls a flow of one unit, while player 2 
controls a flow of 0.33 unit. At Nash equilibrium, player 2 puts all of his flow on the 
upper link and player 1 puts 0.43 of its flow on the upper link and the rest of the flow 
on the lower link. At SSL equilibrium, player 1 put 0.71 of its flow on the upper link, 
pushing player 2 to route 0.09 unit of its flow on the lower link. As a result, the social 
cost at the Nash equilibrium and at the SSL equilibrium are approximately 1.427 and 
1.657 respectively. The price of SSL is approximately 1.161.





Figure 3.4: A simple three-link asymmetric network in which 1 and 3 are private links, 
and 2 is a shared link.
We now consider the asymmetric network in Figure 3.4 in which two nodes are 
connected with three parallel links. Each link has a linear latency function in the form 
t j ( f j )  =  aj( fj )  +  bj for j  € {1 ,2 ,3 } where aj,b■ i >  0. Again player 1 is assumed to 
control one unit of flow and player 2 is assumed to control / 2 > 0 unit of flow. We wish 
to determine the player strategies ( / 1)NE , ( /32 )NE, ( f i )  and ( f i ) .  The cost experienced 
by player 1 is
c 1 = / i M / i )  +  h )  +  (l -  / i ) M l  -  f l  +  / 2 -  f i )  +  b2).
where we substitute / }  and / 2 with 1 -  f 1 and f 2 -  f i  respectively. Differentiating C 1 
with respect to / {  and setting the result to zero, we get
b i - b 2 +  2aif l  +  o2( -2  +  2f\ -  / 2 +  / 2) =  0. (3.9)
Solving (3.9) for ( f i ),  we get
( f 1) =  + b 2 +  a2(2 +  / 2 -  f j )
1 2(ai +  a2)
The cost of player 2 is given by
C2 — ( / 2 ~ /| )(a2(1 — f i  +  f 2 — f i )  +  b2) +  f i (a3(/|) +  63).
Differentiating C2 with respect to / 2 and setting the result to zero, we get
—b2 +  63 +  2 a3/| +  a2(—1 +  / }  — 2/ 2 + 2/|) =  0. (3.10)
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Solving (3.10) for (/|), we have
(~f2\ _  Q2 + b2 -  b3 -  a2f l  +  2q2/ 2 
3 2(a2 + 03)
Solving (3.9) and (3.10) for (/^ N E  ancj (/|)NE^ we Q^ain
, ,ixNE _  3q| +  2a3(— + b2) +  a2( -2bi  +  b2 +  b3 +  2q3(2 +  / 2))
4ai(a2 +  a3) +  a2(3a2 + 4a3)
and
, ,2^NE _  2ai(a2 + b2 -  h  +  2a2/ 2) +  a2(fei +  fr2 -  2b3 + 3a2/ 2)
1 4ai(a2 +  a3) +  o2(3a2 +  4a3)
Exam ple 3.3.5. Consider a network in Figure 3.4 in which the top link, middle link and 
bottom link have a latency of =  2.75, ¿2( / 2) =  f i  and ¿3( / 3) =  3.5 respectively.
Player 1 controls a one unit flow, while player 2 controls a 1.42 unit of flow. At Nash 
equilibrium, player 1 routes a 0.33 fraction of its flow on link 1, while player 2 routes 
all of its flow on link 2. The social cost at Nash equilibrium is approximately 5.27. At 
SSL equilibrium, player 1 routes all of its flow in link 2 and player 2 routes 1.25 units 
of flow on link 2. The social cost at the SSL equilibrium is approximately 5.66, which 
results in the price of SSL of approximately 1.074.
Rem ark 3.3.6. We show in the next chapter that there is no price of SSL if a parallel- 
link network only has homogeneous linear latency functions. However, for asymmetric 
networks, the leader can take advantage even in a network where the all latency functions 
are homogeneous linear, as we show in the next example.
Exam ple 3.3.7. Consider a network in Figure 3.4 in which 4 ( / i )  =  fi,  ¿2(/2) =  2 /2 
and ¿3( /3) =  / 3. Player 1 and player 2 each have one unit of flow. We find a flow ( / / ,  / f ) 
at Nash equilibrium and SSL equilibrium Using the expressions formulated above, we 
have a Nash flow of (0.75,0.75) and SSL flow of (0.76, 0.71). The social cost of the Nash 
flow is 1.625 and the social cost of the SSL flow is 1.644. Hence we have the price of 
SSL of 1.012.
3.4 Discussion
In Table 3.1, we have summarised the maximal price of SSL we obtained for each of the 
network configurations studied. Our results show some lower bounds for the price of 
SSL. The multiplication factor 1.075 for the network with linear latency functions offers 
a lower bound corresponding with an upper bound of 1.322, as we will show in the next 
chapter.
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Description W i ) h i f ï ) 4 (/3 ) Price of SSL 
(approximately)
Affine linear a i /i  +  b\ <22/2 + &2 - 1.075
Quadratic ( / i ) 2 +  afi c - 1.091
Cubic ( / i ) 3 +  a ( / ! )2 c - 1.135
Quartic ( / i ) ‘  +  a ( /i )3 c - 1.161
Asymmetric with linear a i /i  +  h «2/2 +  h 03/3 +  bz 1.074
Table 3.1: The results of the price of SSL for networks with various latency function 
forms with some restrictions. All coefficients are assume to be non-negative.
So far, we have not found any examples of a parallel network for the case of two 
players, which would suggest that the price of SSL is unbounded. In contrast to the 
price of anarchy of a network of two players where one player is atomic and the other is 
nonatomic, Roughgarden showed that the price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large, even 
for a simple two parallel links model for general latency functions. In that particular 
example the price of SSL is not unbounded.
It can be seen from the results that, as we allow a more general class of latency 
functions, the price of SSL increases. This suggests that the price of SSL depends 
crucially on the “steepness” of the network cost functions. An interesting open problem 
on this subject would be how big can the price of SSL be, for unrestricted convex latency 
functions?
Chapter 4
Upper Bounding the Price of 
Selfish Stackelberg Leadership
So far, we have demonstrated in several examples in Chapters 2 and 3 that there can 
be an additional social cost if there exists a player with Stackelberg leadership when 
compared to the standard Nash setting, even in a simple two parallel links model with 
linear latency functions.
In this chapter, we investigate upper bounds on the price of selfish Stackelberg 
leadership (price of SSL), namely the worst possible ratio of the social cost that occurs 
when one of the players is a selfish leader to that of the Nash equilibrium. In particular, 
we focus on the model of two atomic players each with a splittable flow in a parallel-link 
network with linear latency functions. We consider both when latency functions are 
general linear and when latency functions are restricted to homogeneous linear.
4.1 Overview
The main objective of this chapter is to prove upper bounds on the price of SSL. That 
is, we prove the bounds on the worst ratio between a social cost of a SSL flow and 
that of a Nash flow. We concentrate on a simple model of two atomic splittable players 
in a network with n parallel links each of which has a latency function of the form 
£j(fj)  =  CLjfj +  bj where aj , bj >  0. We assume that both players are selfish and want 
to minimise their individual costs. Furthermore, we assume that the total amount of 
flow in the network is one. We prove that there are constant upper bounds that are 
independent of the number of links in the network. Note that all of the notations and 
the definitions used in this chapter are previously described in Chapter 2.
Our main approach to obtain the upper bounds is to bound the social cost of a SSL 
flow with a combination of upper bounds on player individual costs, while the social
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cost of a Nash flow is lower bounded by an optimal cost. To prove the upper bounds on 
player individual costs, we have to know what players’ strategies are in the SSL flow. 
Finding optimal strategies for players are difficult, especially for a leader, we analyse 
two simple strategies, one for each player, that guarantee some upper bounds. That is, if 
the leader plays with the proposed strategy then regardless of what the follower will do, 
the leader’s cost is at most the upper bound, and vice versa. We describes the strategies 
in Section 4.2. Theses strategies are not necessary optimal for corresponding players, 
but the upper bounds for player costs obtained when they are used can guarantee the 
upper bounds for the costs when optimal strategies are used.
In Section 4.2, we prove an upper bound on the price of SSL of 2. In Section 4.3, with 
a slightly more careful analysis on the upper bounds on player costs, we show an upper 
bound on the price of SSL of 4/3. In Section 4.4, we present our main result showing 
an upper bound of slightly less than 4/3, or 1.322 to be precise, by dint of a more 
complicated analysis and also by considering the aloof strategy of Roughgarden [Rou04]. 
This upper bound together with the lower bound of 1.075 shown in Example 3.3.1 in a 
network of two parallel links, demonstrates that the price of SSL is in a narrow range 
of [1.075, 1.322],
In Section 4.5, we consider the model with homogeneous linear functions, namely 
linear functions where every bj is zero (or all bj are identical by normalising). We prove 
that a SSL flow is unique and identical to a Nash flow, consequently, the price of SSL 
is 1 in such a model. Finally, we conclude the chapter with a conclusion and some open 
problems in Section 4.6.
4.2 Two Strategies.
In this section, we consider two strategies, one for each player in a Stackelberg game, 
that provide a suboptimal performance guarantee. The first strategy is for a leader 
(or as we normally refer to as player 1). It was used by Korilis et al. [KL097a] for 
a benevolent leader as a routing strategy in the same model where there is a single 
follower. They proved that a leader using this strategy can always enforce an optimal 
flow.
Strategy 1:
Strategy 1, depicted in Figure 4.1, is for player 1. The general idea is that player 1 acting 
like a benevolent leader, tries to enforce an optimal flow (f®^). Provided that player 1 
can achieve this, it follows immediately that player l ’s cost is, at most, the optimal cost, 
which is the total cost for both players. We describe the strategy as follows.
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1. Compute an optimal flow f^P.
2. Let n < n be the maximal with f~ P > 0.
3. Compute an optimal flow (fSE)2 where (/® ^ )2 =  / 2.
4. Let j* < n be the maximal with (/® ^ )2. > 0.
5. For j  =  j* +  1 to n, set f j  =
6. For j  =  1 to j* , set f j  =  ( /*  -  E " =J*+i / / )  /  (« j E j l i  V aj )  •
Figure 4.1: Strategy 1 for player 1
The first step of the strategy is for player 1 to compute f^P. The second step is to 
QT?divide the links used in f D£:j into two subgroups; one is the group of links that will be 
used by both player 1 and 2 in the SSL flow, and the other is the group of links that will 
be used only by player 1. The list of links that will be used by player 2 can be obtained 
by computing the optimal flow relative to / 2, in other words, computing player 2’s 
strategy as if player 1 is not present in the system. Recall that links are indexed in 
increasing order of bj and an optimal flow preserves the order of links (Corollary 2.2.6). 
Let j* be the maximal indexed link that player 2 will use and n be the maximal indexed 
link used in f °  , then we claim that { 1 , . . . ,  j* }  represents the group of links that will 
be used by both players and {j* +  1 , . . . ,  n } represents the group of links that will be 
used only by player 1.
For links in {j* +  1 ,... ,n }, player 1 fills the latencies to the level that should occur 
in f' . Then, for links in {1 , . . . ,  j* } , player 1 ensures that the difference between the 
latencies of every pairs of links after it has played stay the same. That is, player 1 splits 
the rest of its flow to all the links in this group such that every link is increased with the 
same amount of latency. The fraction of flow player 1 routes to link j  G {1 , . . . ,  j* }  can 
be computed as follows. After allocating flow to links in {j* +  1 , . . . ,  n}, the remaining 
flow of player 1 is f l — Ey=j*+i f j -  Player 1 aims to increase every link with equal
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latency, i.e. al/ /  =  a:j f j  for all i , j  E , j*} .  We compute f j  where j  £ , j*},
f 1
"  j * a f lE U E ?
i=i
ak E L i  i/° .
(4.1)
where 4.1 comes from the fact that every link is increased with equal latency, i.e. a,jf j  
are equal for every j  in {!,••• ,.)*}■ By increasing latencies equally, player 1 ensures 
that player 2 routes its flow like f SE for { 1 , . . . ,  j*}.  Hence the differences between links 
after player 2 has played are the same as that in f^E. In summary, f j  +  f j  =  / p E for 
every j  in { 1 , . . . ,  j* }  and f j  =  f f E for every j  in {j*  +  1 ,. . . ,  n}.
Lemma 4.2.1. Given a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with linear latency 
functions, if player 1 uses Strategy 1 then player 1 ’s cost in SSL equilibria is at most 
the cost of the optimal flow, i.e. C l <
Strategy 2 :
We consider Strategy 2 for a follower (or as we normally refer to as player 2) depicted 
in Figure 4.2. The aim of Strategy 2 is for player 2 to try to create an optimal flow by 
acting similarly to a UE flow. The strategy can be described as follows.
Player 2 first computes an optimal flow. Let h be the maximal indexed link that 
is used in f  . Knowing how much flow player 1 has allocated on each link, form link 
1 to link n, player 2 gradually distributes its flow to the the minimal latency link, i.e. 
link j  with minimal i f l f j  +  f j ) ,  but not to exceed the level of latencies in the optimal 
flow, i.e. f j  +  f j  < f j E.
Clearly, if player 2 routes its flow with Strategy 2, its cost is, at most, the optimal 
cost. This is because if player 1 does not allocate its flow more than the level that occurs 
in the optimal flow, then, using Strategy 2, player 2 will ensure that the combined flow 
is optimal. If there are some links that player 1 routes more than the optimal flow then 
there is enough room on the remaining links for player 2 to use those without making 
their flow more than the optimal flow.
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1. Compute an optimal flow f^E .
2. Let n < n be the maximal with / - E > 0 . in f®E ancj stiH have 
f j  < f f E such that ¿ l i f t )  < . . . <  £n(fn)-
3. For j  =  1 to n, set f j  such that t f l f j  +  f j )  <  i j ( f j+1 +  f j+l ) and
f j  +  f j < f ? E -
Figure 4.2: Strategy 2 for player 2
Lem m a 4.2.2. Given a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with linear latency 
functions, if player 2 uses Strategy 2 then the cost of player 2 at SSL equilibria is at 
most the cost of the optimal flow, i.e. C2 < .
Theorem  4.2.3. Given a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with linear 
latency functions, the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership is at most 2.
Proof. Recall that the price of SSL is the worst ratio of a social cost in a Stackelberg 
game and that in Nash equilibria. By using Lemma 4.2.1 and Lemma 4.2.2, the social 
cost in a Stackelberg game is at most 2C^E. The social cost in Nash equilibria is at 
least CSE, consequently, the price of SSL is at most 2C'®E/C®E < 2 . □
Rem ark 4.2.4. It can simply be seen that, in two-player Stackelberg games in a 
parallel-link network, player 1 can always enforce an optimal flow by using Strategy 1. 
Although we assume here that the total flow is 1, Strategy 1 works with any posi­
tive total flow and with any fraction of flow a leader controls as Korilis et al. proved 
in [KL097a]. This is clearly not necessary true for Strategy 2 for player 2.
4.3 Quick Upper Bound of 4 /3
In the previous section, we oversimplify the upper bounds on players cost by using the 
costs of the combined flow as the bounds on individual costs. In fact, to get closer to 
true bounds, each player upper bound should be the cost of the combined flow minuses 
the minimal of the other player’s cost, or the cost where that player routing all its flow 
on maximal latency links. Using this approach, we determine improved upper bounds 
for player 1 and player 2 in Lemma 4.3.2 and Lemma 4.3.3 respectively. Again using the 
combination of upper bounds on player costs, we prove the upper bound on the price 
of SSL of 4/3 in Theorem 4.3.4. Note that we still assume that player 1 uses Strategy 1 
and player 2 uses Strategy 2.
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Rem ark 4.3.1. We shall denote the minimal latency of links used in by Unim and 
the maximal by ¿max- Since the total flow is always assumed to be one, we have that
o r
Unin < C  < Unax- Obviously this also applies to the cost of player 1 and 2, i.e. 
m̂in — U’1 < Unax and ^nin < C2 <  f/nax if l 1 and U2 denote links used by player 1 and 
2 respectively.
Lemma 4.3.2. Given a parallel-link network with linear latency functions. In a Stack- 
elberg game, player l ’s cost is at most m in{2/1Unin, CS E -  (1 -  /^Unin}-
Proof. Applying Strategy 1, player 1 ensures that the combined flow is socially optimal. 
Thus, player l ’s cost is the optimal cost minus player 2’s cost which is at least all of 
player 2’s flow multiplied by the minimal latency, i.e. (1 -  f 1)£tnin (recall that the total 
flow is one unit). Hence player l ’s cost is at most — (1 — f l )£min.
Alternatively, player l ’s cost cannot be any higher than the cost of it putting all of 
its flow on the maximal latency links. Furthermore, from Corollary 2.2.4, the maximal 
latency of an optimal flow Unax is at most twice the minimal latency Unin for links that 
get used. Hence player l ’s cost is at most 2 /1Unjn.
Combining those two results, we have player l ’s cost is at most iriin{2/Umjn, C^E_
(1 -  /^Unin}- □
Lemma 4.3.3. Given a parallel-link network with linear latency functions. In a Stack- 
elberg game, player 2’s cost is at most min{ C EE — f x£min, 2(1 — f 1
Proof. In a Stackelberg game, we assume that player 2 uses Strategy 2. This implies that 
every link used by player 2 is at most £max which is at most 2£rnin by Corollary 2.2.4. 
The cost of player 2 is maximised when all of player 2’s flow is routed on maximal 
latency links, i.e. C2 <  (1 — f 1)2£min.
Alternatively, player 2’s cost is at most the optimal cost minus player l ’s cost. There 
are two cases to be considered.
Case 1: Player 2 can ensure that the minimum latency of the combined flow of all 
the links is at least Unin- Hence we can pessimistically assume that player l ’s cost is at 
least f x£min which means that player 2’s cost is at most C'^E — f 1 Unit,•
Case 2: Player 2 cannot ensure that the minimum latency of the combined flow is 
at least Unin- Then it uses links that all have latency less than Unin- Thus its cost is 
less than (1 — f x)£m¡n which is less than the above bounding 2(1 — f 1)£m\n.
Combining those results, player 2’s cost is at most minjC1®^ — f x£m-m, 2(1 — f x)£min}.
□
We are now ready to show the upper bound of 4/3 on the price of SSL.
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T heorem  4.3.4. In a two-player, n parallel-link network with linear latency functions, 
the price of SSL is at most f/3.
Proof. Suppose we are given a two-player, parallel-link network with linear latency 
functions. In a Stackelberg game, we assume that player 1 uses Strategy 1, and player 2 
uses Strategy 2. Recall that an optimal cost is in the range between between f min and 
2̂ min (from Remark 4.3.1 and Corollary 2.2.4). There are two cases to be considered.
• The optimal cost is at least (3/2)^mjn. In this case, from Lemma 4.3.2 and
4.3.3, the social cost in a Stackelberg game is upper bounded by 2 / 1̂ mjn + 
2(1— f x)imin =  2£mjn. Hence the price of SSL is at most (2^min) /  ((3/2)£min) < 4/3.
• The optimal cost is less than (3/2)£mjn. Then, similarly from Lemma 4.3.2 and
4.3.3, the social cost in a Stackelberg game is upper bounded by C®E — (1 —
f l )£min +  cSE _  f i£min =  2Cgg -  Hence the price of SSL is upper
bounded by (2CSE -  ¿min)/(CSE) < 4/3.
The combination of the above results proves the theorem.
□
4.4 Upper Bound of Less than 4 /3
In this section, we prove that there is an upper bound on the price of SSL of less than 
4/3. To do that, we improve the upper bound of player l ’s cost in Lemma 4.3.2, in 
which the cost is bounded under the pessimistic assumption so that, in a situation 
where it creates an optimal flow, it is possible for all of player l ’s flow to be routed on 
the maximal latency link and all of player 2’s flow to be routed on the minimal latency 
link.
The outline of the proof of the main theorem in this section is as follows. We define 
the diverse latency property that an optimal flow may or may not have, depending on 
the latency functions of the links. We prove the upper bound in the case that the 
optimal flow has the diverse latency property, then we use an alternative proof in the 
case that it does not have the property. When the optimal flow has the property, we 
insist that player 1 uses the strategy called the aloof strategy [Rou04] that corresponds 
more with what selfish player 1 would do instead of Strategy 1.
Up to this point, we have shown that the price of SSL is at most 4/3 by pessimistically 
assuming that player 1 and 2 use the suboptimal Strategy 1 and 2 respectively in a 
Stackelberg game to enforce an optimal flow. With this approach, player costs depend 
on the optimal cost and the minimum latency of links used in the optimal flow. In 
addition, we know that the optimal cost is in the range between £min and 2t min, hence,
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in Lemma 4.4.1 by assuming player 1 and 2 use Strategy 1 and 2 respectively, we show 
upper bounds on the price of SSL as C^E ciianges jn the range [£mm, 2tmin]. Similarly, 
with this approach, upper bounds on the price of SSL depend on the fraction of player 1. 
As the fraction of player 1 changes, we show in Lemma 4.4.3 bounds on the price of SSL. 
Figure 4.3 depicts the basic ideas by demonstrating upper bounds on the social cost of 
SSL equilibria as C'orj and f L vary. The lemmas will be useful in the next section when 
we prove that the price of SSL is at most 4/3.
Lemma 4.4.1. In a two-player, parallel-link network with linear latency functions, let 
(jSE _  j£ min where 1 < 7 < 2. Then
• if 7 > § then the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership <
• if 7 < | then the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership < .
Proof. When the optimal cost is at least (3/2)^min, the social cost in the SSL setting is 
bounded by 2£min (Figure 4.3(b) and Corollary 2.2.4). Hence the price of SSL is upper 
bounded by
2-̂ rnin ^ 21,riin 2
cSE
If the optimal cost is less than (3/2)£min then the social cost in the SSL setting is 
bounded by 2C^E — £m̂n (Figure 4.3(c)) in which the social cost is player l ’s cost of 
CSE -  (1 -  f l ) £ m i n  plus player 2’s cost of CSE -  f x£min■ Hence the upper bound of 
the price of SSL is given by
2CSE -  £min ^ o emin ^ 2 7 - 1  
USE 7C i „ -  7 ‘
□
Rem ark 4.4.2. As suggested in Figure 4.3, the ratio between the upper bound for the 
social cost and the optimal cost is maximised when the optimal cost is (3/2)t'min.
Lemma 4.4.3. Suppose we have a two-player, parallel-link network. Let f 1 =  a where 
0 < a <  1 then:
• if & then the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership < 1 +  2̂ ~Q̂ ;
• if a <  i  then the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership < 1 +  ^ .
Proof. As mentioned above (Remark 4.4.2), the ratio between and C®E is max­
imised when CSE =  (3/2)^min. Firstly, we consider the case when a >  1/2. In this case, 
player l ’s cost and player 2’s cost in the SSL setting are bounded by C^E -  (1 -  f l )£ min
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(c) Graph of the upper bound of ' when
C SE < (3/2)€min
Figure 4.3: Assuming that player 1 and 2 route flow with Strategy 1 and 2, the graphs 
show the upper bound on C^SL as C^E and / 1 of the corresponding flows vary. The 
graphs depict the basic ideas for Lemma 4.4.1 and Lemma 4.4.3. Dashed lines denote 
player costs as follows: for C 1, h =  f l t max and l2 =  CSE -  (1 -  n; for C2,
l3 =  c ^  -  f H min and U =  ( 1 -  f l ) e  max* Solid lines denote the minimal upper bound 
of C l . Dot dashed lines denote the minimal upper bound of C2. Thick solid lines denoteCQT X X
the upper bound for which is min{/i, l2}  +  min{Z3, 14}.
70 CHAPTER 4. UPPER BOUNDS ON THE PRICE OF SSL
and (1 -  f 1)£max respectively (using Lemma 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). Then the social cost is 
bounded by C SE + (1 -  f ])£mm (using Corollary 2.2.4 for £max < 2£min). Thus, the 
price of SSL is, at most,
^SE +  (1 ~ / 1)̂ min < (1 ~ oQ4nin 2(1 — a)
C'se  ~~ (3/2)4™  ~ 3
Next, we consider a < 1/2. In this case, player l ’s cost and player 2’s have minimal 
upper bounds of CSE -  f l£min and 2f l£min respectively. Consequently, the social cost 
is bounded by C®E +  f 1£min■ Hence, the price of SSL in this case is upper bounded by
CSE + f l£ min - &£min . .. 2(X
CSE -  +  (3/2)4™  -  +  y
□
Using Lemma 4.4.1 and 4.4.3, we narrow the scope of the values of the optimal 
cost and player l ’s flow needs to be considered. Finally, we prove the main result by 
conducting a case analysis of the value of C®E and f 1.
Definition 4.4.4. Let 4nin and fmax respectively denote the minimal and maximal la­
tency in an optimal flow. We say that an optimal flow has the diverse latency 
property (DLP) if at least 1/4 of the flow gets a latency of at most, 1.16^min and at 
least 1/4 of the flow gets a latency of at least 1.84fmin.
Definition 4.4.5. Aloof strategy: (Roughgarden [Rou04]): in a two-player model, player 1 
routes f 1, optimising its cost in player 2’s absence: compute the optimal flow for a total 
flow volume of f 1.
Lemma 4.4.6. Given a two-player, parallel-link network with linear latency functions.
If the DLP is satisfied by an optimal flow, then player l ’s cost is at most 1.915/^min.
Proof. Let S^n and Smax be the sets of links whose latencies in the optimal flow are 
at most 1.16fmin and at least 1.84tmm respectively. We will assume in this proof that 
player 1 uses the aloof strategy. We exploit the fact that, when the DLP holds, player 
1 gets a better performance using the aloof strategy instead of Strategy 1, as described 
earlier.
First, we consider the optimal flow. Using the DLP assumption and Lemma 2.2.5, 
the difference between the constant cost £ j ( 0) (i.e. the marginal costs of the links when 
the flow is zero) of links in Sma,x and those in S'min is at least twice the difference 
between the minimal latency in S'max and the maximal latency in S'min, i.e. 2(1.84trnm -  
1.16£mi„) =  1.364™.
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Next, we consider the SSL setting. With the aloof strategy, if player 1 uses links in 
5'max’ after player 1 has played, the latency difference between Smax and .S'rnin is at least 
half the difference between the value 7 (0 ) in Smax and that in 5min, which is at least 
(1.36£min)/2  =  0.68£min. And if player 1 does not use links in Smax then the difference 
is higher than 0.687nin- Essentially, this implies that, from player 2’s perspective the 
constant cost in 5max is at least 0.68^min more than that in Smin.
By Corollary 2.2.4 and Lemma 2.2.5, there is not enough flow in total for the latency 
in the Smax of links used by either player to be more than 27min. Therefore, the latency 
in Smin after player 2 has played is at most 2£min -  (0.68imin)/2  =  1.66^min.
With the DLP assumption, because there is at least 1/4 of the total flow in Amin. 
player 1 is guaranteed to have at least 1/4 of its flow in Smin. Hence, player l ’s cost is, 
at most, (/74 )(1 .664nn) +  (3 f1/A)2£min =  1.915/^mi„. □
For the case when the DLP is not satisfied, we prove the following upper bound on 
player l ’s cost.
Lemma 4.4.7. If, in an optimal flow, at most 1/4 of the flow gets a latency of at most 
1 • 16̂ min or at most 1/4 of the flow gets a latency of at least 1.84£min, then player l ’s 
cost is at most max{CS^  — £min/4 — 1.16fmm(3/4 — /* ), £min/2 +  ( f 1 -  l/4)(1.84£min)}.
Proof In this proof, we assume that player 1 uses Strategy 1 to ensure that the combined 
flow is an optimal flow. Then, from Lemma 4.3.2, player l ’s cost is at most the optimal 
cost minus player 2’s cost which is lowest when all of player 2’s flow f 2 achieves a 
latency of £mm. However, noting the first alternative of the given assumption, suppose 
1/4 of the total flow achieves a latency of £min, and the rest gets at least 1.16£min, then 
player l ’s cost is, at most, — l mjn/4 -  1.16^min(3/4 -  f 1).
Alternatively, player l ’s cost is maximised when all of / 1 is on the maximal latency 
links. However, from the second alternative of the given assumption, only 1 /4  of the flow 
achieves a latency of more than 1.84^min and the rest of the flow achieves a latency of at 
most 1.84£min. Hence player l ’s cost can be at most (l/4)(2^min) +  ( / 1-l/4 )(1 .84^min) = 
^min/2 +  (/*  — 1/4) (1.84£rain). □
Theorem 4.4.8. In a two-player, n-parallel-link model with non-decreasing linear la­
tency functions, the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership is in the range [1.075,1.322].
Proof In regard to a lower bound, we have obtained a price of SSL of 1.075 in Exam­
ple 3.3.1.
In regard to an upper bound, we start the proof by first identify the scope of an 
optimal cost and player l ’s flow, to which we should restrict our attention. From 
Lemma 4.4.3, we note that we only consider player l ’s flow in the range [0.483,0.517]
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since any scenario in which player l ’s flow is outside this range gives the price of SSL of 
less than 1.322. Similarly, because of Lemma 4.4.1, we only consider the optimal cost 
in the range [1.474£min, 1.5131min]-
We will use the upper bound of player 2’s cost from Lemma 4.3.3. For player l ’s 
cost, we have two upper bounds, one for when the DLP holds and the other for when 
it does not hold.
First, when the DLP is satisfied, we have an upper bound on player l ’s cost of 
1.915/^nun from Lemma 4.4.6. Combined with player 2’s cost, the price of SSL is 
upper bounded by
1.915/^min +  min{CSE - /^min, 2(1 -  f 1) ^ }  ^ 1.915/^min +  C SE -  f l min 
C SE -  C SE
^ , , 0 .915/^min 




Secondly, when the DLP is not satisfied, player l ’s cost is upper bounded by 
max{CSE -  f'min/4 -  1.16^min(3/4 -  f l )A min/2 +  ( / 1 -  l/4)(1.84£min)}. Within this 
proof, we will use (1) and (2) to denote the expression C®E — f?min/4  — 1.16^min(3/4 — f 1) 
and ^min/2 + ( / 1-l/4 )(1 .8 4 £ min) respectively. Thus the upper bound for player 1 ’s cost 
can be represented by m ax{(l), (2)}. We prove the upper bound by an exhaustive case 
analysis as follows:
1. Suppose C^E > (3/2)£min, we consider f 1.
• Suppose / 1 < 1/2, then m ax{(l), (2)} =  (1). Hence the price of SSL is upper 
bounded by
(1) +  min{C®E -  /^min, 2(1 -  /^ m in }
cSE
/  CSE -  W 4  -  1.16£min(3/4 -  f 1) +  2(1 -  f y min
C SE
, ( 0 .8 8 - 0 .8 4 / ! ) ^
-  +  CSE
< . (0-88 — 0.84(0.483))lmin
(3/2)fmin
< 1.317
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• Suppose / 1 > 1/2, we have player 2’s cost < 2(1 -  f x)£min, but player l ’s 
cost is still bounded by m ax{(l), (2)}. The upper bound on the price of SSL 
can be considered in two cases.
(a) When m ax{(l), (2)} =  (1) the price is at most ((1) +  2(1 -  / 1)^min)/C 'gg. 
Thus we have
(1) +  2(1 -  f x)£min ^  C SE -  W 4  -  1 .164^(3 /4  -  Z1) +  2(1 -  f x)£min 
CSE -  CSE
z ,  , (0.88 — 0.84/1)^min
-  CSE
^ (0.88 -  0.84(0.5))lmin
(3/2)£min
< 1.307
(b) When m ax{(l), (2)} =  (2) the price is at most ((2) +  2 ( l - / 1)^min)/C 'gg. 
Thus we have




(2 .0 4 -0 .1 6 (0 .5 ) )^
(3/2)£min
1.307
2. Suppose C®E < (3/2)^min, we consider f 1
• Suppose Z1 < 1/2 then player 2’s cost is at most CSE -  f x£min. Hence, the 
upper bound of the price of SSL can be considered in two cases.
(a) Whenmax{(l), (2)} =  (1), the price is at most ((1)+C®E —f l£min)/C^E.
We have
(1) +  CSE -  f l£min ^ C SE -  ¿min/4  -  1.16£min(3/4 -  f 1) +  C SE -  fH,mi„
CSE ~ CSE
, ( 1.12 +  0.16Z1)̂ min 
-  CSË
< 2  (-1.12 + 0 .1 6 (0 .5 ))^
(3/2)^min
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(b) W henm ax{(l), (2)} — (2), the price is at most ((2)+C^®— 
So we have
(2) +  C SE -  f x£min l min/2 +  (Z1 -  l/4)(1.84lmin) +  C SE -  /U „ 
CSE “  c SE
^  , (0.04 + 0.84/1)^min 
"  USE




Suppose / 1 > 1/2 then m ax{(l), (2)} =  (2), then the price of SSL is upper 
bounded by
(2) +  min{CSE -  /^min, 2(1 -  Z^m in}
CSE
< (2) +  CSE -  f xt  C SE
z  Cin2 + (Z1 -  1 /4)(1.84f’min) +  CbE -  f Xi min 
C SE
, (0.025 TO-OZ1) ^
-  CSE
1 (0.04 + 0,84(0.517) Kmin
1.474£min< 1 +
< 1.322
In conclusion, when the DLP is not satisfied, we have shown that the price of SSL 
is less than 1.322. □
4.5 Homogeneous Linear Latency Functions
In this section, we consider the model with homogeneous linear latency functions— 
linear functions of the form £(x) =  ax where a > 0. It was shown by Hayrapetyan et 
al. [HTW06] that, for parallel-link networks with convex latency functions, every link 
has the same latency in both a Nash flow and a UE flow, which implies that the social 
costs of a Nash flow and a UE flow are equal. The main result in this section partially 
extends the result of Hayrapetyan et al. in a sense that we further show that not only 
will every link in the Nash flow ends up with the same latency, but also the ratios of the 
flows on the links are the same for all players. Furthermore, we prove that a SSL flow 
is identical to a Nash flow in this case, which shows that having Stackelberg leadership,
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in this setting, is not beneficial.
The main result in this section is that the price of SSL is 1 which will be proved via 
the following steps. Essentially, we prove the main result (Theorem 4.5.9) by showing 
that a Nash flow and a SSL flow in this setting are unique and identical. We define 
a term equal shared flow (f ES) for a flow in which every players split their flow in a 
uniform way as described below in Definition 4.5.1. We show that a Nash flow and a 
SSL flow are i ES in Lemma 4.5.3 and Lemma 4.5.8 respectively. To show that a SSL 
flow is f ES, we first prove that the leader must split its flow such that every links are 
increased with an equal latency (Lemma 4.5.7), which then would force the follower to 
do the same (Lemma 4.5.6).
Definition 4.5.1. Given a two-player, parallel-link network with homogeneous linear 
latency functions, a flow is the equal share flow if both players allocate their flow such 
that they increase the latency of every link equally, i.e., for player i, a jfj  =  akf k for 
every pair of links j  and k. We shall denote the equal share flow of mathbf f  with
Clearly, in an equal share flow, every links have an equal latency.
Corollary 4.5.2. For a parallel-link network with homogeneous linear latency functions, 
all of the latencies of the links in are equal.
Lem m a 4.5.3. Let f  be a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with homoge­
neous linear latency functions. At Nash equilibrium, every link will be used, i.e. fj > 0 
for every link j  in the network.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 2.3.4 that, at Nash equilibrium, for all links j  and k and for 
all players i that have / j  > 0, if the following inequality holds,
4(A) + f) ' W  < h(fk) + f t  • 4(A)-
Let us suppose that link k is unused, i.e. f k =  0. The right-hand side of the inequality 
is akfk +  f k (ak) — 0. Then, at least one and possibly both, of the players will want to 
move some of its flow to k. □
Lem m a 4.5.4. A flow f  of two players in a parallel-link network with homogeneous 
linear latency functions is at Nash equilibrium if f  is
Proof. From Lemma 2.3.4, a flow is at Nash equilibrium for all links j  and k and for all 
players i that have / j  >  0, if the following inequality holds,
4 ( A )  + f j  ' Z'jUj) < 4 ( A )  +  fk • 4 ( A ) -
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Let f  be a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with homogeneous linear latency
functions. We show that if f  — then f  satisfies the above inequality. And let us 
rpc
suppose f  =  f  , namely a3fj  =  akf l  for i =  {1,2} and for every pair of links j  and 
k in the network. From Lemma 4.5.3, since all the links are used, the above inequality 
becomes
+ f )  • W  =  4(A) + f t  ■ A(A) 
tj(fj) + f j  • aj = 4(A) + f t  ■ ak
which is satisfied by f  from Corollary 4.5.2, and the assumption a3f j  =  akff. □
Next, we consider a Stackelberg game in this setting. We show that, to optimise 
its cost, the first player must route its flow such that every link has an equal latency. 
To achieve that, we first show the following lemma. The Lemma states that, assuming 
player 2 optimises its cost relative to player l ’s strategy, if player 1 transfers a small 
amount of its flow t from one link to another, then player 2 transfers its flow t/2 back 
in the opposite direction. Then, we show that, in the SSL setting, if player 1 routes its 
flow such that every link is increased with equal latency, then player 2 will do the same.
Lemma 4.5.5. Let f  be a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with homo­
geneous linear latency functions, and f 1 and f 2 be player 1 ’s strategy and player 2‘s 
strategy respectively in the SSL setting. If player 1 transfers a small fraction of its flow 
t > 0 from link j  to link k, then player 2 reacts by transferring at most t/2 of its flow 
back from link k to link j .
Proof. Let us suppose that t > 0 is the small fraction of player l ’s flow on link j  that 
will be transferred, and let t' > 0 be the fraction of player 2’s flow on link k that will be 
transferred back to link j . Before the transfer, the flow on link j and link k are f j  and A 
respectively. If the strategy of player 1 is f 1 =  then, while holding f 1
fixed we can apply Proposition 2.4.5 to optimise player 2’s cost. Let £j(x) =  £j(x +  f j )  
for every link j  in the network, and we have the following property hold when the cost 
of player 2 is optimised,
? (/;)  =4(A2)
al(fj  +  f j )  +  f j  ' aj ~  ak{fk +  fk) +  fk ' ak- (4.2)
After player 1 has transferred the flow, player 2 reacts by transferring back t' from 
link k to link j.  Again, optimising player 2’s cost while holding player 1’ strategy fixed,
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we have
aj ( f j  + / / - *  +  0  +  {fj +  t')aj =  ak( f l  +  f t  +  t -  t') +  (/| -  
ai (/? +  / j  ) +  flj(~ t +  t ) +  fj ■ aj +  t ■ dj =  ak{fl. +  / I )  +  ak(t — t') +  • ak — t1 ■ ak
d j { - t  +  0  +  t' ■ dj =  ak(t — t') -  t' ■ dk (4.3)
where (4.3) is obtained from using (4.2). Therefore, player 2 can transfer back 
min (/| , t/2) of its flow on link k, which gives us the stated result. □
Lem m a 4.5.6. Let f  be a flow of two players in d pardllel-link network with homoge­
neous linear latency functions. In a Stackelberg game, if player 1 distributes its flow 
such that every link is increased with equal latency, then player 2 will do the same.
Proof, a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with homogeneous linear latency 
functions. Let us suppose that player 1 routes its flow such that every link is increased 
with equal latency, i.e. ajfj  — akf k for every pair of links j  and k in the network. Let 
Ij(x)  =  ij (x  +  f j )  for every link j  in the network. While holding player l ’s strategy 
fixed, we apply Proposition 2.4.5 to optimise player 2’s cost. For all links j  and k, we 
have
4 ( / D = 4 ( / fc2)
aj ( f j  + f j )  +  f j  ■ aj =  ak(fk + fk) +  fk ' ak 
2 aj ' fj =  2 ak ■ f k.
This gives us the stated result. □
Lem m a 4.5.7. Let f  be a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with homoge­
neous linear latency functions. In the SSL setting, the first player routes its flow such 
that every link has equal latency.
Proof. Given a flow f  of two players in a parallel-link network with homogeneous linear 
latency functions. Let us suppose that player 1 routes its flow such that every link is 
increased with equal latency, i.e. ajf j  =  akf j  for every pair of links j  and k in the 
network. Let us suppose that player 1 can still decrease its cost by transferring a small 
amount of flow t > 0 from link 1 to link 2. Let / i  and / 2 be the flow on link 1 and link 2 
respectively before the transfer. By using Lemma 4.5.6, we know that h { f i )  =  72( /2).
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Before the transfer, the cost of player 1 is
f l h ( f i ) + +  J2 f fa i f i ) -  (4-4)
j+ l or 2
After the flow transfer of player 1, player 2 reacts by transferring some of its flow 
on link 2 back to link 1, Lemma 4.5.5. Let t' >  0 be the flow of player 2 on link 2 that 
will be transferred back. The cost of player 1 after the transfers is
( / i  — ~ t +  t') +  +  t)i2{ f2 +  t — t') +  f j t j ( f j ) -  (4.5)
j+i or 2
The potential gain, (4.4) - (4.5), must be positive for player 1 to have any incentive 
to transfer. We have
f l h ( f i )  +  / 2W 2) -  ( /1 -  m u ,  - t + t 1) -  ( / j + + t ~ t ' ) >  0 
fi • 01 • /1 + f\ ■ a2 ■ f2 — (/1 -  i)oi(/i -  t + t') -  (/] + t)a2(f2 + t - t ' ) >  0
fl -ai(t-t') +  t- a\ (/1 -  t + t') -  ■ a2(t - t ' ) - t -  a2(f2 + t - t ' ) >  0
t ■ ai(fi  -  t +  t') -  t ■ a2( f2 + 1 -  t') > 0 (4.6)
t ■ ai ■ fi  -  t ■ ax{t -  t') -  t ■ a2 ■ f 2 -  t ■ a2(t -  t') >  0
—t(t — t'){ax +  a2) >  0, (4.7)
note that (4.6) is obtained by using the assumption a,jfj =  a^fl for all links j  and k, 
(4.7) is obtained from the fact that ^i( /i)  =  ¿2( / 2)-
On the left-hand side of (4.7), —t{t — t')(ax +  a2) is always negative because t > 0 
and t' is at most 7/2, Lemma 4.5.5. Consequently, player 1 cannot transfer any more 
flow to decrease its cost. Hence, we have the stated result. □
Lemma 4.5.8. Let f  be a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with homoge­
neous linear latency functions, f  is at SSL equilibrium if f  is the equal share flow.
Proof. By using Lemma 4.5.7 and Lemma 4.5.6, in the SSL setting, both players split 
its flow such that every link is increased with equal latency, i.e. f  is the equal share 
flow. □
Theorem  4.5.9. Let f  be a flow of two players in a parallel-link network with homo­
geneous linear latency functions, so the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership of f  is 
1.
Proof. From Lemma 4.5.4 and Lemma 4.5.8, the Nash flow and the SSL flow of f  are 
identical; hence the social cost is the same, i.e. the price of SSL is 1. □
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4.6 Conclusions
We have shown that the upper bound of the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership 
is a multiplicative constant of 1.322 that is independent of the number of links in a 
parallel-links network with linear latency functions. It is possible that for parallel links, 
the worst-case arises for a 2-link network (by analogy to [Rou02]) which we obtain the 
lower bound of 1.075. In conclusion, we obtain quite a narrow bound of [1.075,1.322] 
for the price of SSL.
In the case where latency functions are restricted to homogeneous linear, we show 
that a Nash flow and a SSL flow are not only identical but also unique. As a result, we 
have proved that the price of SSL in this setting is one.
Perhaps the main question to ask is whether there is a more dramatic cost (perhaps 
depending on the size of the network) in the setting of more general networks.
One alternative line of work is investigating the price of SSL in a model of one selfish 
splittable leader and the rest of the players, each with a negligible fraction of the flow 
(a Wardrop flow). We believe that there is no price of SSL in this setting since the SSL 
solution is essentially the same as Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 5
Bounds for the Convergence Rate 
of a Randomised Local Search in 
a Load-balancing Game with 
Variable-capacity Resources
Up until now, we have been investigating the problem of the quality of a Nash equilib­
rium, setting aside the issue of the computation of a Nash equilibrium. In this chap­
ter, we study a simple algorithm for finding Nash equilibria called “Randomised Local 
Search” (RLS) that can simulate a network of selfish players. In particular, our main 
result shows upper bounds for the convergence rate of RLS in a simple load-balancing 
game with variable-capacity resources.
5.1 Overview
We consider a load-balancing game which essentially is a parallel-link network with 
homogeneous linear latency functions that we studied in the previous chapters. In 
particular, we study the problem of constructing Nash equilibrium by a simple algorithm 
called Randomised Local Search (RLS) that (as we will show) can be realised by a simple 
distributed network of selfish users that have no central control and only interact via 
the effect they have on the latency functions.
RLS can be informally described as follows. Initially, each player is assigned a 
link, and then, at each step, a player and a link are selected uniformly at random. 
The selected player moves its flow to that resource if its resulting cost is lower. That 
move is called “self-improving” , as recent works in this field showed that an algorithm
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that repeatedly makes this kind of moves will eventually reach Nash equilibrium. Our 
contribution here is to investigate the question of how long does RLS takes to reach 
Nash equilibrium in a special case where player flows are an integer?
In Section 5.2, we start by introducing the load-balancing model and note some of its 
similarities and differences to the parallel-link network models studied in the previous 
chapters. In Section 5.3, we present a distributed version of RLS that has been shown 
previously by Goldberg [Gol04]. In Section 5.4, we show the first result of this chapter. 
We prove that there is an upper bound on the expected time for RLS to reach Nash 
equilibrium. We exhibit a bound on the convergence rate that is polynomial in terms of 
the number of players, the number of links and the maximum player flow in the network. 
In Section 5.5, through a more careful analysis, we place a better upper bound on the 
convergence rate in a sense that the number of players has been decreased to quadratic 
power. This can be useful because in a distributed setting, the number of player in the 
expected number of attempts becomes linear. We close the chapter with the conclusions 
in Section 5.6.
5.2 The Load-balancing Model
We continue to use most of the definitions and notations defined earlier in Section 2.1. 
The main difference between the model in this chapter and those in earlier chapters is 
that, here, we focus on a pure strategy; namely every player selects exactly one link to 
route its flow. In other words, for player i £ M, a strategy Sl of player i is a link j  where 
j  £ E. Another difference is that there are m players in the network in this chapter, 
while we usually assume the case of two players in the previous chapters. Furthermore, 
we will assume the player flows to be a positive integer.
Recall that a flow f  denotes a vector of strategies, one for each player. We redefine a 
flow f  as follows. If we are given an initial flow f, let A0(f) =  f, and A/l+1(f) is obtained 
from A/l(f) at step h by performing a single transfer of one player flow from one link 
to another. The total quantity of a flow f  is a positive integer number / ,  that is not 
necessarily one unit, as previously assumed. As regards the strategies of the players, 
Sl(\h) denotes a strategy of player i in a flow A/t at step h.
Following from typical load-balancing games, we assume that each link j  £ E  has 
an associated capacity Cj £ • + . Without a loss of generality, we will assume that the 
minimal capacity is 1 and an integer cmax denotes the maximal capacity. Let fj(Xh) 
denote the fraction of the total flow assigned to link j  £ E in A/j. Each player i £ M  
controls a positive integer flow f l £ • + . Similar to the capacity of the links, we will 
assume that the minimum flow of player is 1 and an integer / max denotes the maximum 
flow of the player. The latency of using link j  at Ah is defined to be the total of flow
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loaded onto j  at Xh divided by the capacity of j  , i.e. £j(Xh) = fj{Xh)/cj. This is similar 
to the homogeneous linear latencies in which 1/cj is the coefficient. The cost of a player 
at a flow Xh, in this chapter, is now defined as the cost of fink £j{Xh), where j  is the link 
used by that player. That is, every players that use fink j  receives the common cost 
equal to the latency of the link that they share.
Note that, often we drop the notation f  and Xh if they are obvious from the content 
or do not need to be denoted.
Definition 5.2.1. The cost experienced by a player that routes its flow on link j  € E 
with respect to a flow Xh is the latency of link j ;  that is, the sum of all player flows that 
are routed on link j ,  divided by the capacity of j .  For every player i
C\Xh) =  ¿ M ,  (5.1)
cj
provided that Sl(Xh) =  j.
We borrow the potential function from [EDKM07] that will map a flow onto a real 
value. It was shown in Lemma 4.1 in that paper that, when a player makes a self­
improving move, the potential in the following definition decreases.
Definition 5.2.2. [EDKM07J The potential function of a flow Xh is defined as the 
real-value function P :
P ( x h) =  Y , i M ^  +  E  —
j e E  i e M
(5.2)
To set a minimal value of the potential function to 0, we subtract the function with 
the minimal possible value P* of potential function for any flow.
Definition 5.2.3. For a flow Xy, the potential function of Xy is
_  + y '  (/* )2 _  p *
j e E  i z M  ° Sl^h)
where P* is the smallest value for any flow Xh that can be taken by Yjj^E(fj(^h))2/cj + 
' E i e M ( f i) 2/ cSH A*)-
We consider the Randomised Local Search algorithm presented in Figure 5.1. Basi­
cally, the algorithm at any one time makes an attempt by randomly choosing a single 
player and a single fink, an attempt is successful when the chosen player reduce the 
potential value, defined in Definition 5.2.3, of the resulting flow by reallocating its flow 
to the selected fink. We call a successful attempt a move. We define the h-th move
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Given an initial flow f,
Repeatedly do the following:
1. Choose a player i e M  from a uniform distribution.
2. Choose a link j  G E  from a uniform distribution.
3. Assign link j  to the strategy of player i if and only if the 
potential value of the resulting flow is lower.
Figure 5.1: Randomised Local Search algorithm
to be a move of one player’s flow from Ah to Ah+i- We use Definition 2.3.3 for Nash 
equilibrium which implies that the model is said to reach pure Nash equilibrium if there 
is no more move available. We study the number of attempts that RLS takes to reach 
Nash equilibrium in this load-balancing game setting.
5.3 A Distributed version of Randomised Local Search
Given an initial flow f, let j  be the link player i uses.
Repeatedly do the following:
1. Generate a delay 5 from an exponential distribution P(S) =  
exp(—5); wait time units.
2. Generate a link k from a uniform distribution.
3. Evaluate the cost of using k instead of j ;  if it is lower, replace 
j  with k.
Figure 5.2: A Distributed version of Randomised Local Search (Goldberg [Gol04]); used 
by each player.
In this section, we present the results proved by Goldberg in [Gol04] to show that 
RLS can be realised as a distributed network, i.e. RLS simulates the network of selfish 
users without central authority to regulate the network. The distributed model is as 
follows. Each player in the network independently makes a sequence of attempts, using 
its own copy of the distributed algorithm depicted in Figure 5.2. We assume that the 
model runs in “continuous time”—that is, only one player is allowed to reallocate its
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flow at each specific time. Then, this process generates a sequence of events in which a 
single player updates its strategy (changing the link to the route) which might change 
the cost that other players experience. We assume that the costs are updated without 
delay.
Rem ark 5.3.1. Because all of the players are using the distributed algorithm, they 
behave similarly. Note that the flow of players does not effect on their behaviours. 
Players only interact through the effects they have on the latency of the links. If a 
player selects the minimal-latency link rather than a random link (as the standard 
“best response” ), then the process of selecting a link would become a 0(m ) operations 
(recall that there are m links in a model). Moreover, as mentioned above, we consider a 
continuous time model to avoid the issue of a link’s latency being changed (by a different 
player) in between being tested and being selected.
In the following theorem borrowed from Theorem 1.1 by Goldberg’s [Gol04], we 
show that the distributed algorithm is a distributed version of the RLS algorithm.
Theorem  5.3.2. [Gol04] If we are given a network of n parallel links and m players, 
then
• Let f  be an initial flow, and f^ E  be the Nash flow with respect to f . If i^ E  ls 
reached with the probability p(f ^ )  by the distributed algorithm then p ( f ^ )  is 
also the probability that the RLS algorithm will find f^ E
• Let t be the expected number of attempts taken for the RLS algorithm to find Nash 
equilibrium. Then, the expected time taken for the distributed algorithm to reach 
Nash equilibrium is t/m.
Proof. First, we prove the first part of the theorem. In the distributed algorithm, the 
significance of the exponential distribution used in the distributed algorithm is that it 
is “forgetful” in the sense that if the exponential distribution P(t) =  exp(—t) then, for 
any positive to:
Pit  | t >  to) =  exp(t — to) for  t > to-
As a result, at any point in time, if all of the players use the distributed algorithm 
then the next player to make an attempted move will be selected uniformly at random, 
regardless of previous events.
For Ao(f) and Ai(f), let p( Ao, Ai) be the probability of using the distributed algorithm 
on Ao such that, after a move, Ao is replaced by Ai. Similarly, let p'(Ao,Ai) be the 
probability of using the RLS algorithm on Ai such that after a move, Ao is replaced by 
A i .
8 6 CHAPTER 5. BOUNDS FOR THE CONVERGENCE RATE OF RLS
Given any initial flow Ao, if we use the distributed algorithm, then the first player 
is selected from the uniform distribution, and then that player selects a link from a 
uniform distribution. This is similar to RLS; consequently, for any Ao and Ai, we have 
p(^o, Ai) =  p'{Ao, Ai).
For flow Ah, let Da(Xft) and D'a(Xh) be the probability distribution over flows after 
a attempts by the distributed algorithm and the RLS algorithm respectively. Hence for 
a positive number k < h, we have Da+1(Xh) =  J2\k Da(Xk)p(Xk, Xh), and D'a+1(Xh) = 
T,\k Da(^k)p'(^kAh)- By induction, Da(Xh) =  D'a{Xh), we proved the first statement 
of the theorem.
Regarding the second statement of the theorem, the expected value of the exponen­
tial random variable 6 in the distributed algorithm is 1. Hence, during a time interval of 
length t, the expected number of attempts moves made by a player using the distributed 
algorithm is t. Thus, the expected number of attempts made by m players is m-t.  T his 
gives the ratio of m between its expected time and the expected number of steps in the 
RLS algorithm. □
5.4 A Quick Upper Bound for the Convergence Time
In this section, we show the first upper bound on the expected number of attempts that 
RLS uses to construct Nash equilibrium in a load-balancing game. The outline of the 
proof is as follows. First, we show in Lemma 5.4.1 that the potential value is lower if a 
player makes a move such that its individual cost is lower. Then, in Lemma 5.4.2, we 
show the upper bound of the potential of an initial flow. After that we prove a lower 
bound on the loss of potential caused by a single move. Combining the upper bound of 
the initial potential and the lower bound of the loss of potential, we prove the bound 
on the number of attempts for Nash convergence in Theorem 5.4.4.
As pointed out by Even-dar et al. [EDKM07], the following lemma shows the fact 
that the game is a “weighted potential game” , as we described earlier in the Previous 
Works section.
Lemma 5.4.1. [EDKM07] For a flow Xh, if, at the h-th move, player i reallocates its 
flow f l from link j  to k, such that the cost o fi decreases then the corresponding potential 
decreases, by a positive value o f 2f l (£j(Xh) — ^(A/j+i)).
Proof. Suppose that, at the h-th move, the given flow is changed from Ah to Xh+i as 
a result of player i rerouting f l from j  to k such that the cost of i is lower. From
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Definition 5.2.3, the loss of potential from to A^+i is:
( / ¡ ( V ) ) 2
P ( h )  - -POm -i ) =  £ + E ^ £: + ̂ ) - E (/.(Ah+i))2
j e E i e M cS'(\h) j e E
( nv
ieM c^'(V+i)
-P * (A fc+i)
(/t(Afe))2 f (/fc(Aft))2 , ( /Q 2 (/j(Afc+1))
Cfc
(/fc(Ah+1))2 ( / l)i \ 2
Cfc Cfc
\2 _  \ _  m2 , /'/U2(/j(A fa))2 - ( / j ( A fe) - r ) 2 + ( / ^
(5.4)
(/fc(Afc+i) -  f )2 -  (/*( A,+i) )2 -  ( /Q 2
C/c
_  2/» - /j(A h) 2 / j • AtAft-n)
Cfc
=  2 f /t(Aft) /fe(A^+i) '
C/c
=  2 f  (^(Ah) - 4 ( A h+i))
(5.5)
where (5.4) comes from the fact that only the loads of link j  and k, and f :i (A/-,) change 
due to the move, and cSi(Aji) =  j  and cSi(Afc+1) =  k\ (5.5) follows from the fact that 
/¿(Afc+i) =  f j {Ah) -  f  and / fc(Afc+i) =  /fc(Aft) +  /*.
Note that for player i to benefit from the transfer the latency difference between 
links j  and k must be more than the latency gain that player i would add to link k. 
That is
/j(Afe) fk(Xh) .  f l
Cj Cfc ck
fMh) fk(Xh) f  . Q
Cj Cfc Cfc
-  4(A/i+i) > o
which shows that the corresponding loss of potential is positive. □
Lemma 5.4.2. For a parallel-link network model ofm  players and n links, assume that 
each player i possesses a positive flow f l in the range { 1 , . . . ,  / max} and each link has a 
positive capacity Cj in the range { 1 , . . . ,  cmax}. The potential of the model is bounded by 
0 ( (m /max)2).
Proof. For a parallel-link network, the potential is maximised when every player controls
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a flow of the / max unit, and uses the same link whose capacity is minimal, i.e. Cj =  1. 
The potential of the network, from Definition 5.2.3, of that flow is
p  _  ^  +  y '  ( / ?)2 _  P *
j e E  i e M  ° Sl(N )
<  (m /m a x )2 +  r n ( f max) 2 -  P *
< 2m2( /max)2,
which gives us the stated result. □
Lemma 5.4.3. For a parallel-link network model, assume that the link capacities and 
player flows are in the range { 1 , . . . ,  cmax} and { 1 , . . . ,  f max} respectively. A move lowers 
the potential by at least 2 /(cmax)2.
Proof. From Lemma 5.4.1, after a move, the potential decreases by
2r  -  4(A/h-i )) =  2f  ( -  f k { X h + l ) )
V cj  Ck )
_  2 f i  ( ck f j ( ^ h )  ~~ cj f k ( ^ h + l ) \
\ cj ck )
Since all player flows and link capacities are integers and the loss of potential must 
be positive, the expression Ckfj (Xh)  ~ cj f k ( ^ h + i )  is an integer greater than or equal to 
one. Therefore, we have the above equation satisfying
2 f i  ( ck f j ( K )  - C j f k ( X h + i ) \  >  _ 2 _  >  2
V 0  ('k )  CjC-k (Cmax)2
□
Theorem  5.4.4. For a parallel-link network ofn  links, whose capacities are in the range 
{1, • • •, Cmax}, and m players whose flow are in the range {1 , . . . ,  / max}, the expected 
number of attempts that RLS takes to reach Nash equilibrium is at most 0 (m 3n ( /max)2(cmax)2).
Proof. From Lemma 5.4.2 the initial potential is bounded by m2( /max)2, and, from 
Lemma 5.4.3, the loss of potential after a move is at least 2 /(cmax)2. Hence, the number 
of moves required for Nash convergence is at most rn2 (/ max)2 (crnax)2/2.
Given m players and n links, the probability of RLS selecting an attempt that 
is a move is at least 1/mn. Therefore, the expected number of attempts for Nash 
convergence by RLS is at most m3n (/max)2(cmax)2/ 2 which give us the stated result. □
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5.5 A Better Upper Bound
In this section, through a more careful analysis, we provide a better upper bound for 
the number of attempts that RLS uses to construct Nash equilibrium. We still use the 
potential function from Definition 5.2.3.
Lem m a 5.5.1. For a parallel-link network with m players, each with a flow in the 
range { 1 , . . . ,  f m3x}, and n links each with a capacity in the range { 1 , . . . ,  cmax}, if 
P(\h) > 2TrnnfmajX +  m (/max)2 where r  E • + then there is at least one pair of links j  
and k, such that £j(\h) ~ £k(Xh) > t .
Proof. Given a flow Ah, let us suppose that j ' is a maximal latency link and k' is a 
minimal latency link. Suppose for a contradiction proof, that P(Xh) > 2rm n /max + 
" i ( /m a x )2, but £f(\h) ~ 4 '(A /0 < r. Prom Definition 5.2.3, the potential of A/> is




W  + y i E .
i e M  cs i()‘h)
( / j ) 2 | y  ( f ) 2 p
- p *
where we substitute a smaller real value P, for P*. Let P  =  YljeE ( / j ) 2/ cj+E i6Af ( / '')2/c ; 
where for j  E E, fj is chosen such that the latency of link each j  with respect to fj is 
equal to the latency of link k!, i.e. the minimal latency. So we have
j e E  ] i e M  b j e E  J i e M  “
< y  ( ( J f l  _  O f f )  +  y  ( ( ¿ I  _  ( m  
jtE\ 4' CJ ) ¿ U s i  < W
< E  ( cf (£f  -  c j f j f )  +  E  c n 2’
j e E  i e M
which comes from the fact that, for each link j.  ij =  fj/cj. Then we have 
P(Xh) <  E  ( c j i j  ~ £j)(tj +  4 ) )  +  rn(/max)2
j e E
— ] E  ~  "b f j )  +  ?™ (/max)2-
Since a latency difference between a pair of links is at most r, and a link can have
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at most m /max of flow, we have
p m  <  E  (r2m/max) +  m (/m ax) 
j£ E
— 2T?7l7l/max +  m (/max) .
This contradicts the earlier assumption, and hence we prove the stated result. □
Observation 5.5.2. For a parallel-link network of m players and n links, assume that 
each player controls a flow in the range { 1 , . . . ,  / max} and that each link has a capacity 
in the range { 1 , . . . ,  cmax}. If there exist a pair of links j  and k such that £j -  tk >  / max, 
then every players on j  can make a move to k.
Proof For i € M; Sl =  j ,  player i wants to make a move to link k if the move results in 
a reduction in its cost. That is £ j { X h) >  £k (Xh) +  f l/ck which implies £ f l X h) -  £k ( X h) >
/max • □
Lemma 5.5.3. For a parallel-link network ofn links and m players, assume that the link 
capacities are in the range { 1 , . . . ,  cmax} and player flows are in the range { 1 , . . . ,  / max}. 
If a flow \h satisfies P{Xh) > 4m n(/max)2 +  m (/max)2, then the probability that an 
attempt by RLS on Xh is a move is at least l/(2n cmax/ max).
Proof. From Lemma 5.5.1, if P(Xh) > 4m n(/max)2 + m (/max)2 then there exist links f  
and k' such that £ j ' ( X y ) -£k'{Xh) >  2/ max. Let us suppose that j '  is a maximal latency 
link and that k' is a minimal latency link. There are two cases to be considered; the 
first case is when at least half of all the links have a latency of more than £y — / max 
and the second case is when fewer than half of the links have a latency of more than
£j' /max-
Case 1 : There are at least n/2 links whose latencies are more than £y -  / max which, 
by Observation 5.5.2, means that there exists a move that every player can 
make on those links. The assumption also implies that at least half of the to­
tal cost of the players is on those links (if we pick n/2 links with the highest 
latency). That is, at least (1/2) YhieM P /Csi ° f the total cost is on those links. 
Since (1/2) J2ieM P /cSi > V 2 J2ieM / 7 Cmax > (l/2 )(m /cmax), there are at least 
m/{2cmax/ max) players whose flows can be moved on those links. Hence, an at­
tempt by RLS has a probability of 1/2cmax/ max of selecting a player whose flow 
can be moved, and a probability of 1/n of selecting link k' to which that player 
may move, so the probability of an attempt by RLS being a move is at least 
1 /  2nCmax /max •
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Case 2 : There are less than n j2 links whose latencies are more than iy  — / max. Since 
j '  is a maximal latency link, the latency on link j '  is at least (XXeM / V cS*)/n — 
f l/cmax)/n > m/ncma,x. Hence, there are at least m /ncmax/ max players 
on link j '  whose flows can be moved to links that have a latency of less than 
£y -  /max (by Observation 5.5.2). We have the probability of l/ncmax/max of 
selecting a player on link j '  whose flow can be moved, and the probability of 1 /2 
of selecting a link to which those players may move its flow. Hence, in this case, 
RLS has the probability of at least l/(2ncmax/max) that an attempt will be a 
move.
Combining the results from Case 1 and Case 2, we proved the stated result. □
We are now prepared to prove the main theorem.
Theorem  5.5.4. For a parallel-link network with m players and n links, assume that 
the player flows are in the range { l , . . . , / max} and that the link capacities are in the 
range {1, . . .  ,cmax}. The expected number of attempts taken by RLS to construct Nash 
equilibrium is at most O (n(mcmax/ max)2(n +  cmax/ max)).
Proof. Suppose we are given an initial flow f. Let S =  (A0, Ai, A2, ..., AN) be a sequence 
of flows in which Ao = f  and Aft+i, for h > 1, is obtained by RLS making an attempt 
on Aft. N  is chosen such that Aat is the first occurrence in S of Nash equilibrium. We 
are interested in the expected value of N, i.e. E(N)  =  E(|S|). We break <S down 
into the concatenation of two subsequences, S — SiS2. Si is a sequence of flows A ft, 
such that -P(Aft) > 4m n(/max)2 +  m (/max)2 and S2 is a sequence of flows Aft, such that 
4m n(/max)2 + m (/max)2 > P(Aft). We obtain bounds on the expected lengths of these 
subsequences that add up to the bound on the expected length of S.
1. Bounding the expected length of S i.
Recall that the initial potential is bounded by 0 ( (m /max)2).
In this case, we have P(Aft) > 4m n(/max)2+rn(/max)2 which, by using Lemma 5.5.3, 
we find that the probability of an attempt by RLS on Aft being a move is at least 
l/(2n cmax/max)- By Lemma 5.4.3, the lower bound on the loss of potential by a 
move is at least 2 /(cmax)2. So the expected loss of potential by an attempt is at 
least l /n /max(cmax)3. Hence, the expected number of attempts of RLS to reduce 
the potential from (m /max)2 to 4mn(fmax)2 +  m (/max)2 is at most
(m /m ax)2 
l / n /m ax( Cmax ) 3
— Tim ( c max/m ax ) •
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2. Bounding the expected length of ¿>2-
We have P{\h) <  4mn(fmax)2 +  m (/max)2. In general, the probability that an 
attempt results in a move is at least 1/mn for any flow that is not at Nash 
equilibrium. From Lemma 5.4.3, any move lowers the potential by at least 2/c^ ax, 
so the expected loss of potential due to an attempt is at least 2/m n c ^ .  Hence 
the expected number of attempts during ¿>2 before a Nash equilibrium is reached 
is at most
4m n(/max)2 +  m (/max)2 ^ 4(mncmax/ max)2 + m2n(cmaa, /max)2
2/™Cmax ~ 2
Combining the results of the expected length of each of Si and S2 we obtain a 
bound of 0(n(rncmax/ max)2(n + cmax/max))• Hence, an upper bound on the length of S 
is 0(n(m cmax/ max)2(n + cmax/max)) • D
5.6 Conclusions
We have shown that RLS can be realised by a simple distributed network of players that 
act selfishly, have no central control and only interact via the effect they have on the 
latency functions. As Goldberg [Gol04] pointed out, that this property is important for 
an algorithm in the study of the “coordination ratio” for this particular situation (for 
example [BGGM06, CV02, FKK+02, KP99, GLM+05, MS07, RT02, CKV02, FGL+03]), 
which is typically discussed as being a price that is paid for not having any central control 
over the players.
We exhibit two upper bounds on the expected number of attempts that RLS needs to 
reach Nash equilibrium. Both bounds are polynomial in term of the number of players, 
the number of links, the maximum flow of players and the maximum capacity of the 
links. However, one of the bounds shows a slightly better bound in term of number of 
players, i.e. m3 to m2, even though it comes with prices in term of number of links, the 
maximum flow of players and the maximum capacity of the links, i.e. n to n2, / 2iax to
f 3 a n d  f 2 t-n f 3 Jm ax  a u u  J m ax J m a x '
A few obvious questions have been raised by the work in this chapter. Firstly, 
what is the convergence rate bounds of RLS for unrestricted flow and capacity? Gold­
berg [Gol04] showed an upper bound for unrestricted flow, but with identical links 
He proved the expected number of attempts of RLS to be polynomial in terms of the 
number of players and the number of links. Secondly, what is the lower bound of RLS? 
Goldberg [Gol04] showed that the lower bound for unrestricted flow in a network with 
identical links is 0 (m 2).
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Another open problem that is in the same direction as this thesis is what is the 
convergence rate of RLS for splittable flow. RLS would be modified as follows. Initially, 
each player split its flow randomly among the available links. At each step, a source link 
and a player that has a flow on that link, and a destination link are randomly selected. 




In this chapter, we will summarise the results presented in this thesis. We also examine 
the significance of these results and try to put them into the context of related works. 
We will then answer the main questions stated in the introduction—namely, how much 
is the additional social cost due to selfish leader? And does the randomised local search 
converge quickly to Nash equilibrium? Finally, we suggest some open problems.
6.1 Summary of the Results
In Chapter 2, we demonstrated Pigou’s example—a simple network of two nodes, two 
parallel links—that is used to demonstrate the additional social cost that could arise 
when there exists a selfish Stackelberg leader even with the simplest network. Not only 
that, but we also demonstrated the other network set-ups that the other related works 
have studied, such as a set-up where a benign leader with a UE follower, a malicious 
leader with an atomic follower.
In Chapter 3, we provided several more examples that demonstrate the lower bounds 
on the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership. We consider both symmetric networks 
and an asymmetric network. For symmetric networks, we provided examples of cases 
in which the latency functions are linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic in a two-parallel 
link network. For an asymmetric network, we considered a network of three links, one 
that each player privately uses, and one shared between the players. All the links have 
linear latency functions. In summary, we showed the price of SSL of 1.075, 1.091, 1.135 
and 1.161 for the networks with linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic latency functions 
respectively. We obtained the price of SSL of 1.074 for the asymmetric network.
In Chapter 4, we presented our main results. For a parallel-link network with affine 
linear latency functions, we proved a constant upper bound for the price of SSL that 
is independent of the number of links in the network. In particular, we first obtained
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a quick upper bound for the price of SSL of 2. Then, through a sightly more careful 
analysis, we obtained a better upper bound of 4/3, and, with a deeper analysis, we were 
able to show an upper bound for the price of less than 4/3. At the end of the chapter, 
we investigate the network with homogeneous linear latency functions. We proved that 
the price of SSL in this case is one and showed a unique Nash and SSL equilibria.
In Chapter 5, we considered the problem of selfish routing from another perspec­
tive. We focused more on the convergence time of an algorithm that construct Nash 
equilibria, rather than the quality of Nash equilibria. A simple algorithm called the 
Randomised Local Search is investigated since it can simulate selfish behaviour in un­
regulated congestion networks. We consider a more general setting than [Gol04] who 
studied a network of identical links. We showed the distributed version of the algo­
rithm. The main results in this chapter are that the upper bounds of the number of 
attempts the RLS needs to achieve Nash convergence which is polynomial for both 
the number of players and the number of links. We first shoed the upper bound for 
0 (m 3n (/max) (̂ rnax) )• Then, through. a more careful analysis, we showed another up­
per bound of O (n(mcmax/ ma*)2(n + Cmax/max)) •
6.2 Discussion
We have answered some of the questions in the problem statement. We have bounds on 
the price of SSL for the two players case, which usually is a foundation on analysing any 
game, on a parallel-link network, which is one of the most studied in network routing 
problems. In particular, we have obtained a narrow bound on the price of SSL for linear 
latency functions. These results should be a stepping-stone towards a more detailed 
analysis of Stackelberg games.
Roughgarden showed in [RT02] that the price of anarchy for a network with infinitely 
many players is unbounded. We only study the price of SSL for two players, and it seems 
that the price of SSL has a constant bound even for a network with a general latency 
function. Moreover, we suspect that the price of SSL is 1, if there are infinitely many 
followers as Nash flow and SSL flow are identical. Perhaps the main question to ask is 
whether there is a more dramatic cost (perhaps depending on the size of the network) 
for the setting up of more general networks. We have obtained a lower bound for the 
price of SSL of a network with latency functions up to quartic. It would be interesting 
to see the price of SSL for more general latency functions.
Another interesting question worth investigation is whether a social cost of SSL flow 
can be less than Nash flow. It seems obvious for the two players case since a leader will 
at improve its cost in SSL flow, or at least will not do worse than Nash flow, on the 
other hand a follower receives a minimal cost in SSL flow if the leader plays with the
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same strategy as in the Nash flow. This is unclear when there are more players.
One extension to this thesis is to consider more than one follower, or in an extreme 
case of infinite number of followers. That is, a leader chooses a strategy before the rest of 
the players simultaneously compete to optimise their cost. As Pigou’s example suggests, 
it may be better for a leader to have an atomic follower than a UE follower. Thus, we 
can imagine that the price of SSL decreases as the number of followers increases. We 
should note that in the case where every players simultaneously routing its flow, the 
more players does not necessary mean the higher social cost in the Nash equilibrium as 
it was shown by Catoni and Pallottino [CP91].
With regard to the convergence rate of the randomised local search in load-balancing 
games, Nash equilibrium can be reached rapidly. One obvious extension along the line 
of the problems studied in this thesis is would be to consider the splittable flow. That 
is, can a variant of RLS reach Nash equilibrium quickly in this setting?
Another open problem would be to consider a unrestricted flow model. In the case 
of integer flow, we have a nice drop in potential of 2 /c^ax. For the network with 
identical links, but general latency functions, Goldberg showed an upper bound that is 
polynomial in terms of the number of players and the number of links.











E. Altman, T. Ba§ar, T. Jiménez, and N. Shimkin. Competitive routing in 
networks with polynomial cost. In Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Computer 
and Communications Societies Conference on Computer Communications, 
2000.
J. Aspnes, K. L. Chang, and A. Yampolskiy. Inoculation strategies for 
victims of viruses and the sum-of-squares partition problem. Journal of 
Computer and System Sciences, 72(6): 1077-1093, 2006.
P. Berenbrink, T. Friedetzky, L. A. Goldberg, P. W. Goldberg, Z. Hu, and 
R. Martin. Distributed selfish load balancing. SIAM Journal on Computing, 
37(4): 1163—1181, 2007.
P. Berenbrink, L. A. Goldberg, P. W. Goldberg, and R. Martin. Utilitarian 
resource assignment. Journal of Discrete Algorithms, 4(4):567-587, 2006.
M. Babaioff, R. Kleinberg, and C. H. Papadimitriou. Congestion games with 
malicious players. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic 
commerce, pages 103-112, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire, and C. B. Winsten. Studies in the economics 
of transportation. Technical report, U.S. AIR FORCE, 1955.
R. Cominetti, J. R. Correa, and Nicolás E. Stier Moses. Network games 
with atomic players. In Annual International Colloquium on Automata, 
Languages and Programming, pages 525-536, 2006.
A. Czumaj, P. Krysta, and B. Vocking. Selfish traffic allocation for server 
farms. In Proceedings of the 3fth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of 
Computing, pages 287-296, 2002.















J. R. Correa and N. E. Stier Moses. Stackelberg routing in atomic network 
games. Columbia Working Paper No. DRO-2007-03, February 2007.
J. R. Correa, A. S. Schulz, and N. E. Stier Moses. On the inefficiency of equi­
libria in congestion games. In Proceedings of the 11th Integer Programming 
and Combinatorial Optimization Conference, pages 167-181, 2005.
A. Czumaj and B. Vocking. Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria. In 
Proceedings of the 13th Annual ACM-SI AM  Symposium on Discrete Algo­
rithms, pages 413-420, 2002.
S. Droste, T. Jansen, and I. Wegener. On the analysis of the (1+1) evolu­
tionary algorithm. Theoretical Computer Science, 276(1-2):51-81, 2002.
E. Even-Dar, A. Kesselman, and Y. Mansour. Convergence time to nash 
equilibrium in load balancing. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 3(2):32, 
2007.
A. A. Economides and J. A. Silvester. Priority load sharing: An approach 
using stackelberg games. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual Allerton Con­
ference on Communications, Control, and Computing, pages 674-683, 1990.
R. Feldmann, M. Gairing, T. Lucking, B. Monien, and M. Rode. Nashifi- 
cation and the coordination ratio for a selfish routing game. In Proceedings 
Automata of the 30th International Colloquium, Languages and Program­
ming, 2003.
D. Fotakis, S. C. Kontogiannis, E. Koutsoupias, M. Mavronicolas, and P. G. 
Spirakis. The structure and complexity of nash equilibria for a selfish routing 
game. In Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, 
Languages and Programming, pages 123-134, 2002.
R. Gibbons. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Printon University 
Press, 1992.
M. Gairing, T. Lucking, M. Mavronicolas, B. Monien, and P. G. Spirakis. 
Structure and complexity of extreme nash equilibria. Theoretical Computer 
Science, 343:133-157, 2005.
P. W. Goldberg. Bounds for the convergence rate of randomized local search 
in a multiplayer load-balancing game. In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual 














P. W. Goldberg and P. Polpinit. The price of selfish stackelberg leadership 
in a network game, 2007. arXiv.org:0711.1242.
O. Giel and I. Wegener. Evolutionary algorithms and the maximum match­
ing problem. In Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical 
Aspects of Computer Science, volume 2607 of Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, pages 415-426, 2003.
P. T. Harker. Multiple equilibrium behaviors on networks. Transportation 
Science, 22(l):39-46, 1985.
A. Haurie and P. Marcott. On the relationship between nash-cournot and 
wardrop equilibria. Networks, 15(3):295-308, 1985.
A. Hayrapetyan, E. Tardos, and T. Wexler. The effect of collusion in conges­
tion games. In Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory 
of Computing, pages 89-98, 2006.
G. Karakostas and S. G. Kolliopoulos. Stackelberg strategies for selfish 
routing in general multicommodity networks. Algorithmica, 2719:514-526, 
2007.
Y. A. Korilis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda. Achieving network optima using 
stackelberg routing strategies. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 
5(1):161—173, 1997.
Y. A. Korilis, A. A. Lazar, and A. Orda. Capacity allocation under noncoop­
erative routing. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 42(3):309-325, 
1997.
V. S. Anil Kumar and M. V. Marathe. Improved results for stackelberg 
scheduling strategies. In Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Col­
loquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, volume 2380 of Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, pages 776-787, 2002.
E. Koutsoupias and C. H. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In Pro­
ceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer 
Science, volume 1563 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 404-413, 
1999.
A. C. Kaporis, E. Politopoulou, and P. G. Spirakis. The price of optimum 
















A.C. Kaporis and P.G. Spirakis. The price of optimum in stackelberg games 
on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions. In Proceed­
ings of the 18th Annual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and 
Architectures, pages 19-28, 2006.
D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic 
Behavior, 14:124-143, 1996.
M. Mavronicolas and P. G. Spirakis. The price of selfish routing. In Proceed­
ings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 
510-519, 2001.
M. Mavronicolas and P. G. Spirakis. The price of selfish routing. Algorith- 
mica, 48(1):91—126, 2007.
T. Moscibroda, S. Schmid, and R. Wattenhofer. When selfish meets evil: 
byzantine players in a virus inoculation game. In Proceedings of the twenty- 
fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pages 
35-44, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
J. E. Marsden and A. J. Tromba. Vector Calculus. W.H. Freeman and 
Company, fifth edition, 2003.
J. F. Nash. Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 2(54):286-295, 
1951.
J. Nocedal and S. J. Wright. Numerical Optimization. Springer-Verlag New 
York, 1999.
F . Neumann and I. Wegener. Randomized local search, evolutionary al­
gorithms, and the minimum spanning tree problem. Theoretical Computer 
Science, 378(l):32-40, 2007.
A. Orda, R. Rom, and N. Shimkin. Competitive routing in multiuser com­
munication networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 1(5):510- 
521, 1993.
M. J. Osborne. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.
C. H. Papadimitriou. Algorithms, games, and the internet. In Proceedings of 
the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 749-753, 
2001.















S. J. Russell and P. Norvig. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. 
Pearson Education, 2nd edition, 2003.
J. B. Rosen. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave 
n-person games. Econometrica, 33(3):520-534, 1965.
R. W. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria. 
International Journal of Game Theory, 2(l):65-67, 1973.
R. W. Rosenthal. The network equilibrium problem in integers. Networks, 
3(1):53—59, 1973.
T. Roughgarden. The price of anarchy is independent of the network topol­
ogy. In Proceedings of the 3fth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of 
Computing, pages 428-437, 2002.
T. Roughgarden. Stackelberg scheduling strategies. SIAM Journal on Com­
puting, 33(2):332-350, 2004.
T. Roughgarden. Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy. MIT Press, 
2005.
T. Roughgarden. Selfish routing with atomic players. In Proceedings of the 
16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1184— 
1185, 2005.
T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the 
ACM, 49(2):236-259, 2002.
C. Swamy. The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network 
congestion games. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual ACM-SIAM Sympo­
sium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1133-1142, 2007.
J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory of games and economic be­
havior. Princeton University Press, 1st edition, 1944.
H. von Stackelberg. Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Springer, 1934.
I. Wegener. Towards a theory of randomized search heuristics. In Pro­
ceedings of the 28th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations 





I. Wegener and C. Witt. On the optimization of monotone polynomials by 
simple randomized search heuristics. Combinatorics, Probability & Com­
puting, 14(l-2):225-247, 2005.
H. Yang, X. Zhang, and Q. Meng. Stackelberg games and multiple equilib­
rium behaviors on networks. Transportation Research Part B: Methodolog­
ical, 41 (8):841—861, 2007.
